


JPRS-TAC-94-002  
8 February 1994



**FOREIGN  
BROADCAST  
INFORMATION  
SERVICE**

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# ***JPRS Report***

## **Arms Control**

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# Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-94-002

## CONTENTS

8 February 1994

### EAST ASIA

#### JAPAN

Tokyo Drafts Accord on Helping Scrap Nuclear Arms .....	1
---	---

### LATIN AMERICA

#### BRAZIL

Space Program Summarized .....	2
--------------------------------	---

#### CHILE

Joins Nonproliferation Tlatelolco Treaty .....	3
--	---

### NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA

#### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Editorial on Regional Disarmament .....	4
---	---

#### EGYPT

Minister on War Production, Chemical Weapons .....	4
--	---

#### INDIA

U.S., Russia Urged To Stop Pressing Nuclear Issue .....	5
---	---

#### IRAQ

Paper Says Chemical Shipment Story Part of 'Conspiracy' .....	6
Foreign Ministry Denies Chemicals Shipment 'Allegations' .....	6

### CENTRAL EURASIA

#### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Details of Tripartite Agreement Reached 14 January .....	8
Preliminary Agreement, Summit Planned .....	8
Documents To Be Signed in Moscow .....	8
Kravchuk Arrives in Moscow .....	8
Agreement Announced .....	9
Yeltsin, Kravchuk Welcome Signing of Trilateral Agreements .....	9
Further on Tripartite Agreement; Russian-U.S. Talks Resume .....	9
CSCE Informed .....	10
Moscow To Compensate Kiev .....	10
Clinton, Yeltsin Sign Agreements After Tripartite Deal Settled .....	10
Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation .....	10
Joint Statement on NPT .....	12
Agreement on Sale of Uranium .....	13
Agreement To Detarget Nuclear Missiles .....	13
Statement on Export Controls .....	14
Joint News Conference .....	14

Russian Views of the Tripartite Agreement .....	15
Deal Criticized .....	15
Rogov Briefing in Moscow .....	16
All Parties Seen as Winners .....	16

## RUSSIA

Kiev Not Expected To 'Revise' Nuclear Agreements .....	17
Military Shipbuilding Factory Builds Timber Carriers .....	17
Dubinina on Further Arms Negotiations With Ukraine .....	18
Commentary on Missile Detargeting .....	18
Joint Venture With U.S. To Earn \$600 Million in Contracts .....	18
CFE Inspections: 'No Discrepancies' in Moscow .....	19
Need for Agreement on Missile Warning System Cited .....	19
Problems of Nuclear Missile Maintenance .....	22
Grachev Talks With Senators Nunn, Lugar .....	23

## BELARUS

Cash Shortage Hits Arms Destruction Program .....	23
Latest Round of Destruction of Military Equipment Begins .....	25
Uranium Compensation Still Under Negotiation .....	25

## KAZAKHSTAN

Foreign Minister Denies Revision of Nuclear-Free Status .....	26
Unexploded Nuclear Device Left Under Semipalatinsk Site .....	26
Accord on Baykonur Explained .....	26

## KYRGYZSTAN

Prospect of U.S. Air Base in Kyrgyzstan Mooted .....	27
--	----

## UKRAINE

Ukraine Maneuvers Before 14 January Agreement Is Signed .....	27
Delegation Meets With Clinton .....	27
Department of Defense Denies 5-6 January Meeting With Russia .....	28
Foreign Ministry Statement 11 January .....	28
Party Leader Wants To Keep Nukes .....	28
Kravchuk Confirms Intention To Sign Nuclear Pact in Moscow .....	28
President Kravchuk Takes Lonely Stand After Tripartite Deal .....	29
Kravchuk Expresses 'Satisfaction' With Trilateral Agreement .....	29
Back in Kiev, Gives Press Conference .....	29
Seeks Parliament's 'Understanding' .....	30
19 January TRUD Interview .....	31
Send Letter to Parliament .....	32
Text of Letter .....	32
Various Reactions to Tripartite Agreement .....	33
Political Officials Comment on Nuclear Deal .....	33
Rukh Opposition Leader Calls Disarmament Treaty 'Treason' .....	34
Further Statement From Opposition .....	34
Expert 'Optimistic' About NPT Ratification .....	34
Scientists Welcome Decision on Nuclear Missiles for Fuel .....	35
Defense Official Gives Positive Interview .....	35
Radetsky Says Agreement 'Timely' .....	36
Benefits Questioned .....	36
Interview With Tarasenko .....	37
Envoy to Russia Praises Agreement .....	39
Kostenko Speaks Out .....	39

Kostenko Interviewed .....	40
Parliament's Presidium Passes No Resolution on Agreement .....	41
National Assembly Accuses Kravchuk of 'High Treason' .....	41
Further Deliberations Planned .....	42
Kostenko Publishes Vehement Article .....	42
Presidential Adviser Gives Interview to L'ECHO .....	43
IZVESTIYA Says Ukrainian Army Wants To Delay Disarmament .....	44
Kiev Radio Quotes U.S. Ambassador .....	45
Supreme Council Ratifies START .....	46
Parliament Speaker Cited on NPT .....	46
Meeting on Securing Conditions for Missile, Space Research .....	46
Columnist Questions Allegiance of Vinnytsya Rocket Army .....	46
Nuclear Control Said 'Technically Possible' .....	47
Official Says Nuclear Weapons Storage Unstable .....	48
Daily Questions Private Takeover of Former Missile Base .....	48

## WEST EUROPE

### REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Defense Minister Proposes Arms Control for Mediterranean .....	50
--	----

### GERMANY

Plans To Ease Arms Export Restrictions .....	50
Internal Debate .....	50
Opposition To Plan .....	50

### TURKEY

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Joining NPT .....	51
---	----

## INTERNATIONAL

Disarmament Conference Opens 25 January in Geneva .....	52
Russian Arms Negotiator Cited on Test Bans .....	52
Criticism of North Korea .....	52
Expanded Membership Debated .....	53



## JAPAN

### Tokyo Drafts Accord on Helping Scrap Nuclear Arms

*LD2401121394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0312 GMT 24 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Andrey Varlamov]

[Text] Tokyo, 24 Jan—The Japanese Government expects to conclude by March this year outline agreements with three republics of the former Soviet Union, excluding Russia, on assistance in scrapping the nuclear weapons they have inherited after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned this today at the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

In the words of a member of the disarmament section at the Japanese Foreign Ministry, diplomats from Tokyo are conducting talks in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and

Belarus to decide what share each of the three republic is to receive of the \$100 million Japan allocated to the CIS in April 1993 to facilitate the scrapping of nuclear weapons and the utilization of radioactive waste.

The Japanese assistance is to be directed toward facilitating International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections at military and civilian nuclear facilities in these countries, and toward ensuring the safe storage of fissile materials. Specific programs will also envisage sending to the spot Japanese specialists from nuclear power stations and nuclear waste depositories, as well as teaching Japanese experience to local staff.

Tokyo has decided to expedite the process of drafting outline agreements in view of the fact that Ukraine and Kazakhstan have recently adopted a constructive stand concerning accession to the Nuclear Arms Non-Proliferation Treaty, and that Kiev has guaranteed the withdrawal of this type of weapons from its territory.

## BRAZIL

## Space Program Summarized

94WS0145A Sao Paulo GAZETA MERCANTIL  
in Portuguese 27-29 Nov 93 p 5

[Article by Virginia Silveira: "Resumption of Space Program"]

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos—The Brazilian space program has received incentives this year [1993] for speeding its development of satellites through the use of funds from the Federal Government's privatization program. The China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS) project and the Complete Brazilian Space Mission (MECB) have a guaranteed appropriation of \$85 million for the coming two years.

Of that total, about \$21 million is already available this year for the Chinese-Brazilian project, and another \$15 million will be available for the period from 1994 to 1996. The first portion of the money was advanced by the Bank of Brazil at the end of October. The funds were obtained from an agreement signed between the Bank of Brazil, the Ministry of Science and Technology, and the Funding Authority for Studies and Projects (Finep).

According to Carlos Santana, manager of the CBERS, release of the \$21 million will make it possible to resume the program by contracting with firms to supply the electronic and mechanical equipment for the satellites. The National Institute of Space Research (INPE), which is developing one-third of the project in cooperation with China, has already issued seven invitations to bid in order to put together the group of firms that will participate in the program.

At present, eight firms are working with the INPE on the Chinese-Brazilian project. They are: Tecnasa Professional Electronics, Elebra Defense and Control Systems, Esca Telecommunications, Composite Technology, Aeroelectronics, Brazilian Nuclear Industries, Digicon, and Embraer.

According to Santana, the new contracts being worked out with the other firms are concerned with electronic and mechanical equipment for the following satellite subsystems: power supply, mechanical structure, image transmitter, data collection transmitter, antennas, and UHF transmitter.

According to manager Santana, Brazilian countertrade in connection with the Chinese-Brazilian program this year has made it easier to expand the space agreement with China. In the first week of November, the two countries signed a new memorandum of intent to carry out a joint study of the feasibility of communications satellites.

According to Santana, the new technological cooperation agreement with China also calls for launching a scientific satellite, to be built by the INPE, in conjunction with the

first satellite in the CBERS series in October 1996. The Brazilian share of the launching is budgeted at \$15 million.

The launch contract was signed early this month between the INPE, Finep, and China's Great Wall firm. It also includes an offset agreement ensuring Brazil of exports in the same amount as the deal reached with China. The remote sensing satellites will be launched using Great Wall's Long March IV rocket. The satellite weighs 1,500 kg and has an estimated useful life of 10 years.

Construction of the scientific satellite, which will be carried on board SSR-1, will be financed by Finep and will cost a total of \$4 million. According to Santana, the satellite will use the same technology as that developed for the data collection satellite, and its mission will be to conduct research in the electromagnetic field of the ionosphere and X-rays and gamma rays.

Under the terms of the agreement signed with China in 1988, Brazil's share of the CBERS program amounts to \$50 million, or 30 percent of the project. It will be up to the INPE to develop one of the cameras for the satellite's observation system, the flight structure, the mechanical model, and the telemetry and communications transponder.

The mission of the remote sensing satellites will be to photograph the planet for the purpose of observing land use and mapping the soil's natural and mineral resources and also to sense climatic changes in specific areas. The satellites will also make it possible to improve agricultural activities by the use of space technology to forecast harvests and planting.

The INPE's program to develop satellites is also supported by a \$24.7 million line of credit extended by Finep. That financing will be used to pay the firms participating in the satellite program, with the funds to be released over the next two years, according to Marcio Nogueira Barbosa, director of the INPE.

The INPE expects at least 13 contracts to be covered by Finep financing. According to the timetable for releasing funds from that line of credit, the firms already hired and those approved in future bidding will receive \$7.5 million this year. Another \$11.1 million is expected in 1994, followed by \$6 million in 1995.

According to Barbosa, the funds from Finep will make it possible to complete part of the work planned in connection with the MECB and the CBERS, which have experienced constant setbacks because of delays in paying the firms involved.

## CHILE

### Joins Nonproliferation Tlatelolco Treaty

PY1801232494 Santiago Radio Cooperativa Network  
in Spanish 2200 GMT 18 Jan 94

[Text] The Chilean Government has become a full member of the Tlatelolco Treaty that proscribes nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Ambassador Carlos Portales signed the document for the president of the Republic.

The Chilean Government also has joined the organization supervising the treaty—the Organization to Ban Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, OPANAL. The

ceremony took place in Mexico City. Argentina joined the treaty during the same ceremony.

Portales said on the occasion that Chile emphasizes its complete renunciation and repudiation of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, adding that the country will contribute with initiatives seeking to prevent the proliferation of these types of weapons.

Chile ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty in October 1974, seven years after signing it. Its implementation, however, was suspended because Chile considered that all countries with nuclear programs in the region had to become an effective part of the agreement.

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

## Editorial on Regional Disarmament

NC2501155094 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0602 GMT  
25 Jan 94

[Text] Cairo, 25 Jan (MENA)—AL-AHRAM writes that the United Nations' efforts to disarm Iraq, which are part of the preparations to implement long-term monitoring of Iraq's armament, again raise the issue of controlling nuclear, conventional, and nonconventional armaments in the Middle East.

The paper recalls the Security Council resolutions that said disarming Iraq should be part of a process to rid the Middle East of all weapons of mass destruction and to establish a new security order in the region.

While acknowledging that the effort to control armaments in the region is primarily linked with an Arab-Israeli settlement, the paper, in its editorial today, adds that the part of these resolutions that has been implemented involves Iraq alone.

AL-AHRAM stresses that the Iraqi threat, which some parties used as an excuse in the past, no longer exists. It adds: Further, achieving progress in the efforts to control armaments will necessarily create a better climate for boosting the overall settlement process.

## EGYPT

## Minister on War Production, Chemical Weapons

NC1201133994 Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic  
6 Jan 94 p 6

[Interview with Major General Engineer Muhammad al-Ghamrawi, minister of state for war production, by Jamal Kamal; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] **Kamal:** Why is there interest in developing and enhancing the war industry when Egypt, the region, and the world are embarking on a new stage of peace in which certain restrictions are being imposed to control armaments and producing countries that monopolize on weapons production are calling for restrictions on the transfer of arms production technology?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** I have been asked these questions many times, even by people working in war production. I always answered with another question: Why should the Armed Forces be maintained and why should there be a constant call for developing and upgrading these forces?

If peace is the goal a state seeks to achieve and maintain to curb political and military tension and therefore provide more favorable conditions for best use of its resources to enhance the state's strength and enable it to continue its march toward progress, there must be a power to protect that peace. A general rule in the military, though, says that if you want peace you should be ready for war. Whoever advocates peace and tries to

protect it through his own weakness would be signing his own death warrant. It is wrong to think that peace means doing away with or reducing the numbers of the armed forces because they are no longer needed for pursuing the state's national interests. The truth is that the lack of power makes the state a prey for ambitious persons and vulnerable to various risks at all times. This creates domestic instability and directly affects development plans. [passage omitted]

**Kamal:** But there are international calls to control armaments and curb the expansion of war production. Steps have actually been taken to prevent the export of arms production technology.

**Al-Ghamrawi:** What is being said about controlling armaments or curbing expansion in military production is meant to make the various forms of war production exclusive to a group of states that monopolize it and control its prices.

The best evidence of this can be found in the fact that the major states' arms exports to the Third World in two years alone exceeded arms exports for 10 years. Besides, what does armament control have to do with developing your military industry, if your goal is to satisfy the needs of your Armed Forces and develop the equipment they already have? Developing the military industry does not mean exporting it or trading in it in a way that undermines stability. [passage omitted]

**Kamal:** What is the major goal behind the development of the Egyptian military industry?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** The goal is to enhance the ties between the Ministry of War Production and the Ministry of Defense, which is the main user of military products. In other words, we want to provide for the needs of the Armed Forces and to link our plan for production to the Armed Forces' armament plan. [passage omitted]

**Kamal:** How can Egyptian military production be developed while there are restrictions on the transfer of arms production technology?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** This is an important issue that forms a large part of the new development strategy. This strategy is based on a new reading of the actual situation and on developing a new vision to cope with that situation.

Egypt's moderate policy and its belief in mutual interests and interrelation has helped it acquire many technologies without fear of abusing them. Egypt succeeded in acquiring the latest technologies from the United States, France, and some East European states. Our moderation provides us with the needed grounds to obtain what we want.

As for our vision, it is based on two main factors:

1. To utilize what we already have.



2. To develop and update what we already have and conduct further research. [passage omitted] **Kamal:** What are the markets for Egyptian weapons under the current international competition?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** The Arab and African states. I think that with some political effort we can find the best marketing formula so that the revenue can be spent on developing the weapons.

**Kamal:** Do you think it is possible in the current situation in the Arab world to establish an Arab military industry?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** I still believe that Arab states have many capabilities to cooperate in military industry without fear. We are capable of entering the sphere of military production with products that meet international levels.

**Kamal:** Why do foreign papers attack the M-1 tank factory every now and then?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** The Egyptian factory for the production and repair of armored vehicles—which began with the production of the U.S. M-1 tank—was a considerable addition to the power of Egyptian military production. It is one of the most modern military factories built in the world recently. Military industries are always questioned and are subjected to attacks every now and then. It seems that Egypt's and its workers' success in building the factory and absorbing the tank manufacturing technology, the peak of military technologies, frightens some people. But we will go on with the project according to plan.

**Kamal:** But the project will be completed in 1997. Does this mean that the production license will be withdrawn and the factory closed?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** There is no such thing as withdrawing a production license. The hypothetical shelf life of the tank is 20 to 25 years. Tanks in general need overhauls, maintenance, and development. The M-1 tank we are manufacturing is only a developed version of the M-60-A-3. There is also the M-1-A-2. Moreover, can anyone take back from you the technology you have learned?

We started the overhauling of the M-60-A-3 in the factory and we will start the overhauling of the M-1. We are studying how to meet new demands. A joint study is under way with the Armed Forces to select an armored combat vehicle to be manufactured in the factory.

**Kamal:** Since the 122-mm and 130-mm guns were manufactured, the Egyptian artillery factory has not produced new pieces of artillery. Why?

**Al-Ghamrawi:** We obtained a license to manufacture the 120-mm barrel of the M-1 tank in the artillery factory. This is one of the latest technologies in the world and it is different from that of ordinary artillery. There is also a project to produce the strategic steel needed for the artillery industry in the factory.

**Kamal:** Some foreign newspapers once in a while report that Egypt is producing chemical weapons.

**Al-Ghamrawi:** We have an established and unchanging principle: We do not manufacture any type of chemical weapons. We only manufacture the equipment needed to protect ourselves against these weapons.

**Kamal:** Some people talk about the need to privatize military production.

**Al-Ghamrawi:** Privatizing the war industry is out of the question. Like the Armed Forces, war production is one of the elements of Egyptian power and national security. If it is not possible to buy security from any state, then war production cannot be sold. Privatization is unsuitable for war production. [passage omitted]

## INDIA

**U.S., Russia Urged To Stop Pressing Nuclear Issue**  
*BK2501134394 Delhi PATRIOT in English 17 Jan 94*  
*p 4*

[Editorial: "New Agenda on Arm-Twisting"]

[Text] In a joint statement on nuclear non-proliferation, Presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin have asked India and Pakistan to be a part of the multilateral talks aimed at "transforming the subcontinent into a nuclear-free zone." While Mr. Clinton's crusading zeal to keep Asia tethered on the other side of the nuclear divide is old hat, the surprise package is Mr. Yeltsin's adoption of Mr. Clinton's preachy role—to India and Pakistan—on missile and nuclear non-proliferation. No doubt, Mr. Yeltsin is toeing the American line, but it is totally at variance—therefore, the surprise—with the more guardedly prudent stand of the former Soviet Union, which had not publicly joined the London Club on the nuclear issue. And, therefore, tactfully avoided pressing India too hard on the NPT [Nonproliferation Treaty] issue. Mr. Yeltsin apparently has no such compunctions in joining the Big-League in its discriminatory attitude of keeping the Third World away from nuclear technology. India's reluctance to do so is a morally justifiable one. While she has not balked at the prospect of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty coming into force in 1996, India has taken exception to the regional pressure that is being applied on her to accept the NPT, or its regional variation cobbled together by Islamabad and Washington. The position taken by the presidents of America and Russia makes little sense if the nuclear weapons powers continue to exercise their prerogative of testing and developing their nuclear arsenals. A vapid declaration of "no first use" sounds even sillier, if also discriminatory, when the U.S. in particular laughs at any suggestion of a global ban on nuclear testing as a first step towards eliminating all nuclear weapons. The "have's," it would appear, are not so susceptible to U.S. pressures on nuclear disarmament, and can with impunity cock a

snook at Uncle Sam's vain glorious threats of applying economic sanctions on those found guilty of testing. China exploded her nuclear device with aplomb; and North Korea unequivocally showed that "tough measures" just would not work. But what of the U.S. indulgences that have been responsible for furnishing Israel's "clandestine nuclear arsenal," and of overlooking Pakistan's boast of possessing military nuclear capability? Mr. Clinton and Mr. Yeltsin would do well to desist from feeding us such pious homilies on NPT, and revise their opinions on what India should, or should not, do. India's security imperatives—surrounded as she is with nuclear warheads cutting a wide swathe from the Central Asian Republics to the Indian Ocean and eastwards in China—demand a certain policy. There should be global action for the elimination of all nuclear weapons. Pakistan's premier Benazir Bhutto has said that her country will not roll back its nuclear programme "under any circumstances." Surely, there is a limit to which India can be pushed.

## IRAQ

### **Paper Says Chemical Shipment Story Part of 'Conspiracy'**

JN3101154994 Baghdad INA in English 1350 GMT  
31 Jan 94

[Text] Baghdad, Jan 31 (INA)—Another chapter of U.S.-led conspiracy has opened with the allegations that German and Saudi inspectors have found two containers loaded with hundreds of tons of chemicals on board a freighter at Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia. The inspectors claim that the freighter was heading to Beirut where the chemicals were to be unloaded and transported to Iraq which will use the stuff in making missiles, says THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER editorial.

The news spread as quickly as possible and the Western as well as the American media flexed their muscles in manipulating the allegations to serve their masters' interests. The above-mentioned media quoted a German official as saying that German intelligence has obtained the information of the freighter from their Saudi counterpart.

Those who have fabricated this story are themselves the same enemy of Iraq. They themselves were behind the imposition of sanctions against the Iraqis and they themselves were parties to the U.S.-led aggression which destroyed Iraq's infrastructure and killed thousands of innocent Iraqi people. Hence what they claim comes as no surprise to the Iraqis who are well-aware of the tactics of their enemy, the editorial added.

When Iraq announced that it was ready to abide by all UN resolutions these dubious circles began to launch campaigns with the aim of putting a spoke in the wheel of Iraq [words indistinct] states to even recommend the lifting of the more than three years sanctions against a nation of 18 million people.

The daily maintained that the human rights issues was on top of U.S. agenda of conspiracy against Iraq. The U.S. and its allies Britain and France in particular released their accusation against Iraq and said that Iraq was abusing human rights in the south of the country and denying the people in the north food rations. What these circles alleged is definitely false because those people, the Iraqis, who live in the south of the country are suffering from the same sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN under U.S. pressures. As to the people of the north, the Iraqi Government sends them their food ration regularly. But the outlawed elements there, supported by the U.S. and its allies, steal the food ration of their people and sell it in the black market.

Today the U.S. and its allies have created another way to distort Iraq's reputation before the international community which is calling for an end to the blockade imposed on the Iraqis. Furthermore, the Saudi regime for its part has been showering money upon their puppets in the Western and American media to publicize such a lie, the motive of which is well-known for the Iraqis. The Saudi regime only wants to keep the embargo on Iraq to serve the interests of its allies.

Nevertheless it has become crystal clear that the U.S. and their agents including the Saudi puppets can never succeed in either undermining the morale of the Iraqis, nor can they deceive the world public opinion because the truth will soon come up and those who fabricated the allegations will be exposed by their own people, THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER concluded.

### **Foreign Ministry Denies Chemicals Shipment 'Allegations'**

JN2601213394 Baghdad INA in Arabic 2050 GMT  
26 Jan 94

[Text] Baghdad, 26 Jan (INA)—The Foreign Ministry tonight categorically dismissed western and American news media allegations of chemicals used in the manufacture of fuels for missiles being found aboard a German ship coming from Saudi Arabia. Following is the text of the statement:

Western and American news media have attributed a statement to Dieter Vogel, a German Government official, in which he said that German intelligence services have had access to information from Saudi Arabia to the effect that a search of a German freighter, docked at the Port of Jeddah, by Saudi and German inspectors turned up two containers including hundreds of tonnes of a chemical stuff, used in the manufacture of fuels for missiles.

[word indistinct] this ship [words indistinct] chemicals [word indistinct] from China and then [words indistinct] of its freight in Hong Kong. The vessel's travel plan called for it to dock in Cyprus before proceeding to Beirut, its final destination. The ship owners then claimed that the chemicals consignment was to have been transported from Beirut to Iraq.

The Foreign Ministry hereby categorically denies these allegations. The fabrication of lies has become a hackneyed tactic resorted to by certain quarters known for their hostility toward Iraq and the Iraqi people, among them the Saudi regime. The idea is to level baseless accusations against Iraq, spread lies, and cast doubt with the object of keeping the wicked blockade in place. This

is because more and more circles and nations within and outside the UN Security Council are demanding the removal of the blockade.

The Foreign Ministry hereby condemns these groundless allegations and the role of the guileful Saudi regime in making up such lies.



## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

## Details of Tripartite Agreement Reached 14 January

## Preliminary Agreement, Summit Planned

AU1001125394 Paris AFP in English 1243 GMT  
10 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Moscow, Jan 10 (AFP)—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has been invited to join a summit meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian leader Boris Yeltsin after Moscow and Kiev reached an agreement in principle on the future of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal, the Kremlin announced Monday.

Yeltsin's press service said the Russian leader had invited Kravchuk to Friday's summit after reaching an "agreement in principle on certain important issues of shared interest, including nuclear weapons."

A presidential spokesman declined to elaborate on the agreement, but Clinton has previously said that he would only meet with Kravchuk after an accord had been finalized on the dismantling of Ukraine's nuclear arsenal.

Yeltsin's spokesman would only say that discussions were under way concerning several documents that the three leaders would be signing during their meeting in Moscow. [passage omitted]

## Documents To Be Signed in Moscow

LD1301214794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1625 GMT 13 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow January 13 TASS—Documents on problems on nuclear arms in Ukraine are expected to be signed at a tripartite summit of Russia, the United States and Ukraine on Friday. A mechanism of the implementation of Ukraine's decision on the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from its territory will also be worked out, ITAR-TASS learned from informed sources on Thursday.

This applies to 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and some 1,500 warheads. Weapons that, in opinion of the U.S. side, are the most dangerous ones, SS-24 and SS-19 missiles, are to be dismantled within three years under an agreement that is to be signed.

The signing of the documents on dismantling the entire Ukrainian nuclear potential is to end a prolonged debate on the destiny of the Soviet nuclear arsenal that remained in the Ukrainian territory after the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991. This will mean keeping to the schedule outlined in the 1992 Lisbon protocols. Under the protocols two other former Union republics with nuclear arms—Kazakhstan and Belarus—

supported the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and agreed to destroy nuclear arms, turning them over to Russia for the purpose.

But the Ukrainian parliament, ratifying the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty on November 18, 1993, made a number of reservations: on the control of strategic nuclear forces in the Ukrainian territory, on the elimination of extra carriers and charges, on control over disassembly and destruction of nuclear charges. Ukraine made its non-nuclear status and stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear weapons conditional upon guarantees of its national security by nuclear states.

Several rounds of tripartite talks of Russia, Ukraine and the United States were held last month. The foreign press notes they were held until President Clinton said in Brussels on Monday that an agreement on problems of nuclear arms in Ukraine became a reality.

The compensation and splitting between Ukraine and Russia of proceeds from the sale of enriched uranium was among central problems at the talks. The United States pledged itself to form a semi-state corporation which will buy uranium contained in warheads for nuclear power plants to make up for the expenditures for nuclear arms destruction. In the runup to the President's visit to Moscow, the U.S. Congress earmarked a sum of 175 million dollars as a step to promote the destruction of nuclear warheads in Ukraine, to compensate for the dismantling of nuclear arms. The U.S. Congress also endorses economic aid to Ukraine amounting to 155 million dollars.

Participants in the tripartite negotiations believe the signing of documents on problems of nuclear arms in Ukraine must ease tensions that have complicated relations between the United States, Russia and Ukraine of late. New agreements in Moscow will promote the establishment of peace and tranquility in the world and a greater cooperation of the three countries.

## Kravchuk Arrives in Moscow

LD1301211094 Moscow Ostankino Television First  
Channel Network in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Jan 94

[Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by correspondent Natalya Chernyshova at Moscow airport on 13 January; from the "Novosti" newscast—recorded]

[Text] Chernyshova: Leonid Makarovich, would you say a few words about your talks with Clinton?

Kravchuk: They were good, normal talks. We discussed several problems. The first one, naturally, was the nuclear problem; the second, the economic one, our relations with the United States. We discussed questions connected with tomorrow's signing of documents by the presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine. I think this is a great breakthrough, a political breakthrough, an economic breakthrough. The main thing is

that we have succeeded in resolving a very complicated global problem—the nuclear one—in a civilized way, in the interests of our states, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States, and, of course, of the entire world.

**Chernyshova:** And what compromises have been made by Ukraine and by Russia?

**Kravchuk:** Well, the compromises are natural. We have reached an agreement. That is no longer a secret—compensation for Ukraine's tactical nuclear weapons, and, of course, the agreements which have already been signed on strategic nuclear weapons, normal economic relations, normal economic ties, the exclusion of any pressure, territorial integrity of states, mutual respect, relations of partnership. That is to say, frankly, that this is nothing new. It is all generally accepted in the world. The only thing is that we have so far been finding it very difficult to get accustomed to this.

**Chernyshova:** Will the Ukrainian parliament ratify this agreement?

**Kravchuk:** I think it will ratify the agreement because it is a good solution for everyone, including us. It is good in that it increases our people's awareness that we are being treated with respect, normally, as a country, as a state, and not as some—well—secondary appendage. That is the first point. Second, everything is being resolved fairly, therefore the parliament must ratify. I am convinced of this.

**Chernyshova:** And tomorrow you will sign the agreement?

**Kravchuk:** Absolutely!

#### Agreement Announced

LD1401670394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0658 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Genadi Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton and Leonid Kravchuk signed a tripartite statement and an appendix to it on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the Ukrainian territory. The documents were signed in the St. Catherine's hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace.

They reaffirmed the non-nuclear status of Ukraine and provided mechanisms of the withdrawal of nuclear warheads from its territory to Russia, as well as compensation to Ukraine for the warheads turned over to Russia.

Russia and the United States will guarantee to Ukraine its security as a non-nuclear state.

#### Yeltsin, Kravchuk Welcome Signing of Trilateral Agreements

LD1401093594 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service  
in Russian 0743 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 14 January—After the signing of the trilateral documents on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine, Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton, and Leonid Kravchuk replied to journalists' questions.

"We have not thought nor do we think that Ukraine ever posed any danger to Russia, but this is a historic day for the international community. The documents on Ukraine's elimination of nuclear weapons and adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the three Presidents signed, are another step in the nuclear disarmament of the world," Boris Yeltsin said, replying to a question by an ITAR-TASS correspondent. [passage omitted]

Leonid Kravchuk told journalists that starting today, "Ukraine's security has been substantially enhanced, because by signing these documents along with the Presidents of Russia and the United States it has obtained from each confirmation of its security."

#### Further on Tripartite Agreement; Russian-U.S. Talks Resume

LD1401074394 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 0640 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] Documents with regard to the Russian-U.S. talks are to be signed in the Kremlin today. Our observer Yuliy Semenov has the details and is on the phone:

[Semenov:] Hello again from the Kremlin. The Kremlin is magnificent, as ever, but both presidents and their assistants have other things on their minds, working hard since early morning.

Several minutes ago the trilateral meeting smoothly turned into a bilateral one. Documents on the results of the meeting between the three presidents connected with the problem of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament have been signed: a joint statement, which has the status of a treaty, an appendix to it, and letters that the delegations exchanged, setting out their specific views.

The essence of what has taken place is that the agreement that has been reached reflects a balance of interests. Each side had to make some concessions, but the final result is a victory for all—a victory for the principle of the non-proliferation of nuclear arms.

Two hundred nuclear warheads will be transported from Ukraine into Russia over the next 10 months, and the withdrawal timetable will be agreed on. It is not being made public because it is a working schedule.

The United States and Russia extend security guarantees to Ukraine. Great Britain, as is known, has already joined in this. Russia will compensate Ukraine in an equitable and honest way—as Boris Yeltsin put it—for its nuclear fuel, and a proportion of Ukraine's financial debt to Russia is wiped off as part of this compensation.

For its part, the United States will substantially assist Russia and Ukraine in the implementation of the accords, and this naturally includes material assistance. All the participants in the meeting have appraised these results as a breakthrough.

Replying to journalists' questions following the signing of the documents—a brief meeting took place—Yeltsin said that this was a historic day for the nuclear security of the whole world and for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and was an important step in world disarmament.

Bill Clinton's view is that by agreeing to sign these documents and to resolve problems, Ukraine has made its position in the world weightier, having strengthened the security of the United States, Russia, Ukraine, and world security as a whole. Clinton said that the potential for nuclear espionage, terrorism, and blackmail has been diminished.

This will make it possible both for Russia and Ukraine to raise their living standards for their citizens. His view is that Ukrainian prestige will grow in the world; more people and states will wish to cooperate with Ukraine, and Ukraine will be altogether better off as a result.

Finally, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk said that his view was that this step would help strengthen everyone's security and the security of Ukraine in particular, because it was precisely in the U.S. and Russian guarantees—their nuclear umbrella—that Ukraine saw its security. If we are friends with Ukraine and Russia, nothing will threaten us. [sentence as heard]

Currently, as I am speaking, the Russian-American dialogue has been resumed—a plenary session of both delegations with all officials present is taking place in the Yekaterinskiy Hall in the Kremlin.

A whole package of U.S.-Russian documents will subsequently be signed, to be followed by a news conference, during which we will be given complete information.

#### CSCE Informed

LD2101123494 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian  
1558 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Statement by the Embassy of Ukraine in Austria—date not given]

[Text] [No dateline as received]—Speaking at a plenary session of the special forum committee of the CSCE for cooperation in the area of security in Vienna on 19 January, Ambassador Yu. Kostenko, head of the delegation, informed the participants about the signing of the

tripartite statement in Moscow by the Presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the problem of nuclear disarmament. The representative of Ukraine noted that this statement, the text of which was disseminated at the CSCE forum on behalf of the delegations from Ukraine, the United States, and Russia, crowned a long political and diplomatic marathon and is a result of intensive and complex work. It confirmed a well-known truth: Any problem, even the most complex ones, can be resolved only by way of compromises. The ambassador drew attention to the fact that the tripartite statement mentions political guarantees of Ukraine's security too—that is it confirms its independence, sovereignty, and existing borders.

The representative of Ukraine emphasized that the Ukrainian Government is counting, in connection with the elimination of nuclear weapons located in Ukraine, on receiving from the CSCE the necessary assistance and support in ensuring Ukraine's national security on the basis of the principles of the Helsinki Final Act.

On behalf of the European Union, the head of Greece's delegation read out an EC communique in connection with the tripartite statement. The communique evaluates highly the accords achieved and expresses the hope that the legislative procedures necessary for them to come into force will be carried out without delay.

Speaking at the session, representatives from the United States and Russia also evaluated highly the tripartite accords, emphasized that they are opening the way to nuclear disarmament, and expressed the hope that they will come into force and be fully implemented in the near future.

[signed] The Embassy of Ukraine in Austria

#### Moscow To Compensate Kiev

LD2001165094 Moscow Mayak Radio Network  
in Russian 1600 GMT 20 Jan 94

[Text] Grigoriy Karasin, Russian Foreign Ministry's official representative, has confirmed that Moscow will provide Ukraine with fuel elements for the needs of atomic power engineering as a compensation for the nuclear charges which are being withdrawn. Speaking at a briefing in Moscow he added that the purchase by the United States of a part of the uranium released during the dismantling of nuclear weapons would contribute to solving the financial issues which emerge in this context.

#### Clinton, Yeltsin Sign Agreements After Tripartite Deal Settled

#### Joint Statement on Non-Proliferation

LD1401123294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1151 GMT 14 Jan 94

[Text] [No dateline as received]



**Joint Statement by the President of the Russian Federation and the President of the United States on Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means of Their Delivery**

[Text] President Yeltsin and President Clinton, during their meeting in Moscow on January 14, 1994, agreed that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their missile delivery systems represents an acute threat to international security in the period following the end of the cold war. They declared the resolve of their countries to cooperate actively and closely with each other, and also with other interested states, for the purpose of preventing and reducing this threat.

The presidents noted that the proliferation of nuclear weapons created a serious threat to the security of all states, and expressed their intention to take energetic measures aimed at prevention of such proliferation.

- Considering the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as the basis for efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, they called for its indefinite and unconditional extension at conference of its participants in 1995, and they urged that all states that have not yet done so accede to this treaty.
  - They expressed their resolve to implement effective measures to limit and reduce nuclear weapons. In this connection, they advocated the most rapid possible entry into force of the START I and START II Treaties.
  - They agreed to review jointly appropriate ways to strengthen security assurances for the states which have renounced the possession of nuclear weapons and comply strictly with their non-proliferation obligations.
  - They expressed their support for the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in its efforts to carry out its safeguards responsibilities. They also expressed their intention to provide assistance to the agency in the safeguards field, including through joint efforts of their relevant laboratories to improve safeguards.
  - They supported the nuclear suppliers group, and agreed with the need for effective implementation of the principle of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition for nuclear exports with the need for export controls on dual-use materials and technology in the nuclear field.
  - They reaffirmed their countries' commitment to the conclusion as soon as possible of an international treaty to achieve a comprehensive ban on nuclear test explosions and welcomed the decision to begin negotiations at the conference on disarmament. They declared their firm intention to provide political support for the negotiating process, and appealed to other states to refrain from carrying out nuclear explosions while these talks are being held.
  - They noted that an important contribution to the goal of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would be made by a verifiable ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and by the most rapid conclusion of an international convention to this effect with the widest possible participation of states and on a non-discriminatory basis.
  - They agreed to cooperate with each other and also with other states to elaborate measures designed to prevent the accumulation of excessive stocks of fissile materials and over time to reduce such stocks.
  - They agreed to establish a joint working group to consider:
    - including in their voluntary IAEA safeguards offers all source and special fissionable materials, excluding only those facilities associated with activities having direct national security significance;
    - steps to ensure the transparency and irreversibility of the progress of reduction of nuclear weapons, including the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable material under IAEA safeguards. Particular attention would be given to materials released in the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to ensure that these materials would not be used again for nuclear weapons.
  - The presidents also tasked their experts to study options for the long-term disposition of fissile materials, particularly of plutonium, taking into account the issues of non-proliferation, environmental protection, safety, and technical and economic factors.
  - They reaffirmed the intention of interested organizations of the two countries to complete within a short time a joint study of the possibilities of terminating the production of weapon-grade plutonium.
  - The presidents agreed that reduction of the risk of theft or diversion of nuclear materials is a high priority, and in this context they noted the usefulness of the September 1993 agreement to cooperate in improving the system of controls, accounting, and physical protection for nuclear materials. They attached great significance to further joint work on the separate but mutually connected problems of accounting for nuclear materials used in the civilian and military fields.
- Both presidents favored a further increase in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons.
- As the heads of the countries that have the world's largest stockpiles of chemical weapons, they acknowledged particular responsibility for eliminating the threat posed by these weapons. In this context, they declare their resolute support for the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and their intention to promote ratification as rapidly as possible and entry into force of the convention not later than 1995.

—To promote implementation of a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, they welcomed the conclusion of the implementing documents for the Wyoming memorandum of understanding and agreed to conclude work in as short a time as possible on the implementing documents for the bilateral agreement on the destruction of chemical weapons.

—The presidents reaffirmed their desire to facilitate the safe, secure, timely, and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons in the Russian Federation and the United States. They applauded the joint chemical weapons destruction work plan recently concluded between the two countries which leads the way for the United States to provide additional 30 million dollars in assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction. The United States also agreed to consider appropriate additional measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction programme.

—They reiterated the importance of strict compliance with the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons and of continued implementation of measures in accordance with the Russian-American-British statement of September 1992, which provides inter alia for the visits of facilities and meetings between experts in order to ensure confidence in the compliance with the convention.

—They supported convening a special conference of the states' parties to the convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons in order to consider measures that would contribute to transparency and thereby confidence in compliance with the convention and its effectiveness.

The presidents expressed the determination of their countries to cooperate with each other in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.

—They welcomed the conclusion of the bilateral memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the United States of America signed in September 1993, noted the importance of this agreement for ensuring mutually beneficial cooperation between Russia and the U.S. in the field of space exploration, and agreed to collaborate closely in order to ensure its full and timely implementation.

—The U.S. welcomed Russia's intention to join the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and undertook to cooperate with Russia in facilitation of its membership at an early date. The Russian Federation and the United States of America are certain that further improving the MTCR, including the prudent expansion of membership, will help reduce the threat of proliferation of missiles and missile technologies in the regional context as well.

The presidents of the two countries agreed that, in addition to strengthening global norms of non-proliferation and working out agreements to this effect, close cooperation is essential in order to develop policies on non-proliferation applicable to specific regions posing the greatest risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

—They agreed that nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula would represent a grave threat to regional and international security, and decided that their countries would consult with each other on ways to eliminate this danger. They called upon the DPRK to honour fully its obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in connection with the treaty, and to resolve the problems of safeguards implementation, inter alia, through dialogue between IAEA and DPRK. They also urged full and speedy implementation of the joint declaration of the ROK and the DPRK on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

—They support efforts to reach agreement on the establishment of a multi-lateral forum to consider measures in the field of arms control in non-proliferation that could strengthen security in South Asia. They call on India and Pakistan to join in the negotiation of and become original signatories to the treaty banning nuclear weapons test explosions and the proposed convention to ban production of fissile materials for nuclear explosives and to refrain from deploying ballistic missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction to each other's territories.

—They agreed that Russia and the U.S., as co-chairs in the Middle East peace process, would actively promote progress in the activity of the working group for arms control and regional security in the Middle East, striving for speedy implementation of confidence-building measures and working toward turning the Middle East into a region free of weapons of mass destruction, where conventional forces would not exceed reasonable defense needs.

—They firmly supported the efforts of the UN special commission and the IAEA to put into operation a long-term monitoring system of the military potential of Iraq, and called upon Iraq to comply with all UN Security Council resolutions.

#### Joint Statement on NPT

LD1401101894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0953 GMT 14 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The Russian and US Presidents called on all states of the world to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and pledged to cooperate in order to prevent the spread of mass destruction weapons.

The Presidents called for an "indefinite and unconditional extension" of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at the conference of its participants in 1995 and "urged that all states that have not yet done so to accede to this treaty," according to a joint statement adopted by Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton on Friday.

They called on North Korea to honour its obligations under the treaty and urged a full and speedy denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. They also called on India and Pakistan to refrain from deploying ballistic missile capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

In order to promote the non-proliferation regime the Presidents stressed the need for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests and on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, including military plutonium.

Yeltsin and Clinton reaffirmed their desire "to facilitate the safe, secure, timely and ecologically sound destruction of chemical weapons" in Russia and the United States.

The USA is going to provide "additional 30 million dollars in assistance to support an analytical chemical laboratory in Russia to facilitate chemical weapons destruction... And to consider other measures to support Russia's chemical weapons destruction programme," according to the document. [punctuation as received]

The Presidents also urged a strict compliance with the convention prohibiting biological and toxin weapons and pledged to cooperate in preventing the proliferation of missiles capable of carrying mass destruction weapons.

#### **Agreement on Sale of Uranium**

*LD1401103494 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1018 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Anna Bakina]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The Russo-American contract on the sale of enriched uranium was signed at the Russian Ministry of Atomic Power on Friday. Russian President Yeltsin welcomed the agreement at a news conference in Moscow on the same day. "I am very satisfied that an agreement on uranium was signed," he said.

Under the contract to operate for 20 years, Russia plans to turn over to the United States 500 metric tonnes of weapon-grade uranium worth around 12 billion dollars. It will be extracted from 20 thousand units of nuclear ammunition during its elimination.

The uranium will be reprocessed to serve as fuel for nuclear power plants.

Russian Minister of Atomic Power Viktor Mikhaylov said on Friday that this agreement means a step to real

nuclear disarmament. He said the contract was concluded under an intergovernmental agreement between Russia and the United States signed in February last.

The need for joint work with the United States in this area stems from the fact that the United States controls 50 per cent of the world market of uranium, while Russia's share in this market is only five to six per cent. "The contract will bring to Russia a source of foreign currency, while the industry of the U.S. can draw on Russian technologies," the minister believes.

There was a separate discussion during the preparation for the signing of the contract on the sharing of profits from the contract between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. The minister said it is for experts to establish if there is profit from the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Vast funds are so far spent on the dismantling of nuclear weapons and utilisation of nuclear charges.

Experts believe the document signed on Friday has a commercial character in addition to political. William Timbers, the head of the U.S. side at the signing, acting manager of the U.S. enrichment corporation, said it is the first time in history that disarmament can bring profit to states.

#### **Agreement To Detarget Nuclear Missiles**

*LD1401090394 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
0831 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS—The Russian and U.S. Presidents agreed to detarget their strategic nuclear missiles, aimed at each other's country by June 1994, thus ending nearly a 50-year period when the two superpowers viewed each other as the main adversaries.

"The Presidents announced that they would direct the detargeting of strategic nuclear missiles under their respective commands so that by not later than May 30, 1994 those missiles will not be targeted," according to the Moscow Declaration signed by Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton on Friday.

"Thus, for the first time in nearly half a century—virtually since the dawn of the nuclear age—the United States and Russia will not operate nuclear forces, day-to-day, in a manner that presumes they are adversaries," according to the document.

The Presidents also urged to end nuclear tests and observe the nuclear and other non-proliferation regimes.

They "strongly supported completion of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible time" and "expressed concern over increasing challenges to global non-proliferation regimes," the declaration said.

The Presidents "agreed upon the need to strengthen those regimes and... to create a new mechanism to



enhance transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and sensitive dual use technologies," according to the document.

#### **Statement on Export Controls**

*LD1401125194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1212 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Text] [no dateline as received]

#### **Joint statement on issues of export controls and policy in the area of transfers of conventional weapons and dual-use technologies**

[Text] The secretary of state of the United States of America and the minister of foreign affairs of the Russian Federation underscored the staunch commitment of their countries to efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to enhance global and regional stability. In keeping with the spirit of the new strategic partnership between the United States and Russia the ministers have agreed on development of wide-ranging cooperation in the field of export control. Moreover, they have agreed that all necessary steps in this field be taken expeditiously, and have established a senior-level working group for this purpose, as well as to initiate bilateral cooperation in the areas specified in a memorandum of intent signed this day in Moscow.

The ministers expressed satisfaction with steps taken since the last meeting of the President of the United States and the president of the Russian Federation to eliminate the vestiges of the Cold War, such as the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which according to the understanding reached by COCOM members will be terminated not later than March 31, 1994. They also welcomed the decision to establish a new multilateral regime for enhancing responsibility and transparency in the transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use technologies. This new arrangement would not be directed against any state or group of states, and would prevent the acquisition of such items for military end uses if the behavior of a state is or becomes a cause for serious concern as determined by the participants of the new multilateral regime.

The United States and Russia, as leading exporters of conventional weapons, military equipment and dual-use technologies, are convinced that additional measures are needed on an international basis to increase responsibility, transparency and, where appropriate, restraint in this area. They expressed their willingness to work with other countries in bringing about the early establishment of a new multilateral regime in order to achieve these objectives, which would supplement existing non-proliferation regimes, in particular through arrangements to exchange information for the purpose of meaningful consultations.

#### **Joint News Conference**

*LD1401105894 Moscow Russian Television Network  
in Russian 0840 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Statement by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin at news conference in Moscow—live]

[Text] Esteemed ladies and gentlemen, I shall come to the main point straight away. U.S. President Clinton's first visit to Russia has passed off very fruitfully. It could not have been otherwise: we know one another too well, there was too much that had to be done, and our peoples too were expecting much of us. This visit is based upon the realities of today, and at the same time looks to the future. As regards the difficult past, the U.S. President and I closed that book very firmly back in Vancouver.

The work in Moscow proceeded at a tense pace, and purposefully. Specific accords and agreements have been reached which are important both for Russia and for the United States—and for the whole world. The negotiations took place at a crucial time for our country. The old habits and stereotypes are crumbling, an active search for something new is under way both in our country and in the United States.

We could be said to be in the throes of a common Russo-American revolution. The citizens of the Russian Federation approved a new constitution at free and democratic elections, and for the first time elected their own parliament without duress. I do not agree with those who think that our first attempt was a flop. If one looks deeper than the individual names and populist slogans, then all in all, the people have opted for a better life, for legality, and for predictability.

This is a lesson which we all still have to learn from in order to prevent mistakes being repeated. I confirmed quite definitely to the U.S. President that our course is aimed at the development and deepening of the reforms, and with stepping up social orientation. I am sure that the country will gain more stability and a sound social peace. Bill Clinton has expressed a subtle understanding of the peculiarities of our situation. You see, the Americans have experienced and are experiencing quite a lot, too. We can count on complete support for the reforms being carried out by the Russian president, the Government, and the reformers in the new parliament.

I have talked about both the problems in our economy, about the positive changes in it, and about the elements of stabilization. I stressed that at the present time it is not humanitarian aid that we need but full-blooded cooperation, taking into account the transitional nature of the young market economy of Russia.

Specifically I find that, together with the Tokyo package and with Clinton's package in Vancouver, that the most tangible support for Russia would be for the American market to open up to our exports, be it raw materials or machines. I am very content that today an agreement on uranium has at last been signed after two years of talks.



Cold war restriction must be removed altogether, restrictions like the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Artificial barriers imposed under the pretext that Russia is dumping should be removed. And let's just say that the case with our uranium is more likely just fear of competition from more advanced technology and cheaper material.

Bill Clinton has done much since Vancouver. He has kept his word as regards dismantling the economic obstructions of the cold war. Discriminatory restrictions have been removed from U.S. internal legislation, or most of them. About 5,000 types of Russian goods are no longer subject to increased taxes. The U.S. President has done much to introduce Russia into international financial and economic organizations. I do not think it will be long before the G-7 becomes the G-8.

Russo-American relations have finally moved into the phase of mature, strategic, global partnership in all spheres during these talks. The partnership has opened the way to general understanding, both of the new prospects ahead and of the new problems. We are both convinced that the modern world should be democratic, open, and integrated. As regards equality, mutual benefit, and accounting for each others' interests, there is no need to talk about this anymore, it goes without saying. This principle vector of our partnership is set out in the Moscow declaration which we have signed. It reflects and reinforces the historical improvement in Russian-American relations in Eurasia and the world as a whole.

Our mutual activities aimed at strengthening strategic stability and security are taking on new substance. Thanks to them, in the last few months alone the world and our countries have avoided many traps and errors. There is also an evident positive result—the strengthening of cooperation in the sphere of security and disarmament, peace-keeping, cooperation, and economic openness.

The ground-breaking step which has finally been taken in Moscow is a denouement in documents leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine. I consider the document which was signed today by the three presidents to be historical. Everyone wins from this, first and foremost the Ukrainian people themselves. The agreements reached at our trilateral summit meeting save resources, get rid of disagreement, and give a good example to other countries. They are reinforced by the Russian-American statement on strengthening all regimes for the non-proliferation of weaponry of mass destruction. And the durability of non-proliferation is at present, as is well known, being seriously tested.

The U.S. President brought us right up to date on the 'Partnership for Peace' concept adopted in Brussels. The idea is seemingly from NATO, but it contains a primordial element of Russian-U.S. joint creative work. This concept is an important step in the creation of a security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok, which rules out the formation of new divisive lines or zones of unequal security.

We see in this idea one of the options for building a new Europe—one of them, but not the only one, of course. We shall put specific content into this channel of cooperation, including in the military sphere. And in doing so we shall not, of course, forget the other collective security structures in Europe, above all the well-tried institutions of the United Nations and CSCE.

I briefed the President in detail about the integratory processes that have got under way on the territory of the former Soviet Union, and in particular about the latest summit meetings within the context of the CIS. There need be no fear of any neo-imperialist lust here—Russia's only interest is in stability. It is undertaking honest mediatory efforts to extinguish the hotbeds of conflicts on the perimeters of its new borders. We are ready to cooperate widely and even to coordinate our actions here with the United Nations, the CSCE, and with the entire international community. Unfortunately, the international community itself has not as yet shown a great deal of enthusiasm. There has been a wary reaction to our specific proposals, whether in Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, or in Tajikistan.

I think that the United States and ourselves will now have a greater understanding on this very important question.

I firmly raised the question of human rights violations among national minorities, especially in the Baltic area. There should be no double standards here, whether it is taking place in Haiti or in the Baltic area. As a result we adopted a statement with teeth on ensuring human rights, and the President confirmed that he personally would adopt corresponding measures on contacts with the Baltic countries, so that discrimination against the Russian-speaking population there will ultimately be abandoned.

I do not want things to sound too upbeat. That does not reflect the nature of our frank and businesslike conversations. There were, and will be, disagreements. But the main thing is the desire to seek understandings, which is later embodied in specific policies. Such is the flight assignment for the Russian-American partnership. It will be a good replacement for the flight assignment for strategic missiles, which will now not be aimed at one another. Thank you.

## **Russian Views of the Tripartite Agreement**

### **Deal Criticized**

94WC0022A Moscow *SEGODNYA* in Russian  
15 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Pavel Felgengauer: "Choosing an Objective American Style"]

[Text] Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin have agreed that the strategic nuclear missiles of the United States and Russia will now be trained in not on the territory of the "probable enemy," but instead—on the empty regions of

the world ocean. Now if something were to happen, the combined megatonnage of the two superpowers would merely slaughter fish and, perhaps, a couple of unfortunate fishermen.

This, of course, is a large step forward compared to Cold War times when, at the beginning of the eighties, on both sides of the ocean fingers were literally quivering over the launch buttons. The re-aiming of the strategic missiles was possibly the last in a long list of peaceful initiatives of Gorbachev, Reagan, and Bush, which made the beginning of the nineties quite different from the beginning of the eighties.

In this case, the initiative came from the American military. The Pentagon was concerned about reductions of staff and combat readiness in the Russian Army, about which there were many reports last year, and also the general crisis in our country, as a result of which, as they think there, there was a greater probability of unsanctioned or accidental launching of missiles.

The Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs was happy to support the new peace initiative, and the Ministry of Defense and General Staff had no objections. The agreement was signed, but neither in the United States nor in Russia was there any possibility of monitoring compliance. All questions of controlling strategic nuclear forces (SYaS) are a carefully kept state secret. Nothing is known specifically—all one can do is guess. But one can assume with a certain amount of confidence that the Russian (Soviet) missiles were not aimed anywhere in particular anyway. There are various possible versions of their application and, correspondingly, a set of flight assignments. The order to launch and, correspondingly, the number of the flight assignment come from Moscow at the same time, and the team on duty in the underground command point in a standard situation does not participate in the launch at all. It merely echoes the commands from Moscow in the event of a possible failure of the electronic system, but itself can launch nothing without an order from Moscow granting permission.

When a year and a half ago President Yeltsin spoke about the fact that our missiles were not aimed at the cities of England and the United States, he undoubtedly spoke the truth, although in the West they did not really understand this ("Where are they aimed, then?") Probably for the Americans aiming the missiles in a different direction really could serve as an additional safeguard against an accidental nuclear war. But since the majority of Americans, particularly the military—patriots of their homeland—are firmly convinced that the American way of solving any problem is the best, they are thus convinced that our equal triad of strategic nuclear forces is more or less a copy of their triad. Which in reality is far from the case. Frequently, fundamentally different technical and military-political solutions were used in the Soviet Union.

The most reliable thing would probably be for our presidents to simply take and exchange nuclear buttons,

and thus put an end to the threat of nuclear war once and for all. Incidentally, the already mentioned differences in the organization of strategic nuclear forces could make sure that this exchange would not be altogether equivalent, either. It has long been known that what is good for the Russian is good for the German (or, say, the American)... Or, as Sir Kipling wrote: "East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet."

### Rogov Briefing in Moscow

LD2101173294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1652 GMT 21 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Dmitriy Chubarov and Denis Perkin]

[Text] Moscow January 21 TASS—Ukrainian agreement to dismantle and store nuclear warheads from SS-24 missiles within ten months is one of the few results of the Russian-Ukrainian-U.S. negotiations, President of the National Security and International Relations Center Sergey Rogov told a briefing here today.

Rogov criticized the agreement, saying "commentaries claiming the tripartite statement on nuclear arms removes all problems related to nuclear weapons stationed on Ukrainian territory are too hasty".

In his words, the major drawback of the document is that it is not concrete. It carries no schedule of nuclear arms withdrawal from Ukrainian territory. If there is no withdrawal before the conference on non-proliferation of nuclear arms due to be held in 1995, the international community will face serious problems in discussion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's future and a possibility of its joining by China, Israel and North Korea, stressed Rogov.

Even if Ukraine withdraws 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 1,500 warheads declared in the statement, it will not be able to sign the treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear arms. In the words of Rogov, Ukraine has another 670 nuclear warheads from air-based missiles and gravity bombs.

### All Parties Seen as Winners

PM2401200594 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA  
PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 3

[Interview with Russian Atomic Energy Minister V. Mikhaylov by Vladimir Gubarev; place, date not given: "Enthusiastic Uranium Deals. Clinton Has 'Donated' \$12 Billion to Russia"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] The Moscow meeting between the presidents of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine has prompted a number of rumors. In Kiev Kravchuk's opponents are claiming that Russia "did well out of the uranium deal" whereas the Ukrainian president was "sold short." Some people in the United States are saying that Clinton "gave away" \$12 billion to Russia—this is the amount it is

proposed to pay for uranium destined for U.S. nuclear electric power stations, which will be obtained from our nuclear warheads. Finally, "joyous" hopes have arisen in the Russian Government: The word there is that U.S. dollars will now come flooding into our country....

I was keen to ask the following questions in an interview with Russian Atomic Energy Minister V. Mikhaylov:

**Gubarev:** How did Ukraine lose out by this deal?

**Mikhaylov:** The level of Ukraine's security has increased—so in fact Ukraine has benefited. Some of the reprocessed uranium from the nuclear weapons will go back to Ukraine in the form of fuel rods for the reactors of nuclear power stations. You must bear in mind that an extremely critical situation has developed in Ukraine regarding weapons and their storage and servicing. The weapons which have been delivered to us are very dangerous—scheduled maintenance has not been carried out, nor have they been serviced. I will not beat about the bush, I am very worried by the weapons situation there—you simply cannot play around with nuclear warheads! It must be clearly understood: Ukraine cannot be a nuclear power—neither the technical nor any other conditions exist there. Moreover, if Russia were not a nuclear power, in present conditions we too would be unable to build weapons or to service them at the appropriate level.... Quite honestly, I do not understand how people can play political games with nuclear weapons. I am convinced that the agreement signed in Moscow has saved Ukraine from new "Chernobyls."

**Gubarev:** What have the Americans gained?

**Mikhaylov:** They have made several billion dollars on this contract. Basically, U.S. uranium-235 enrichment plants are defective. Compared with our plants, they are obsolete and the technology is substandard. Their enrichment plants are about 20 times less efficient than ours in terms of electricity consumption. Therefore the Americans are closing down their enterprises and our fuel is going to their nuclear electric power stations. Incidentally, there are approximately 100 reactor units in the United States. The government is basically a "middleman" now, it is reselling our fuel for nuclear electric power stations. I think it will make about \$3 billion on this contract.

**Gubarev:** What about Russia?

**Mikhaylov:** The contract benefits us. But not in the financial sense. First, the process of dismantling weapons is very expensive—according to expert estimates, it works out at \$30,000-100,000. The arithmetic is simple, and therefore you can see that "fat profits" will not be coming our way.... But for me the important thing lies elsewhere: This contract enables us to maintain Russia's nuclear industry, retain our cadres, and keep our scientific centers. In addition, the world will become a safer place: There are currently too many weapons at nuclear storage facilities. I am telling you this in all seriousness, since all my life I have been involved in

developing nuclear weapons.... But I would like to reassure our fellow citizens: There is quite enough uranium in Russia to fully ensure supply to our nuclear power industry and weapons complex for many decades to come.

## RUSSIA

### Kiev Not Expected To 'Revise' Nuclear Agreements

LD3101151894 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1457 GMT 31 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow has no reason to believe that Kiev might "revise" the Russian-Ukrainian-American agreements on nuclear arms, the chief Russian negotiator at the talks with Ukraine, Yuriy Dubinin, told Interfax.

"Further negotiations on this issue are required, to determine the procedure of their implementation, not to define or change the agreements reached at the highest level," he said.

With reference to the problem of the Black Sea Fleet, Dubinin pointed out that "it can be resolved, and must be resolved, particularly from the point of view of care for the Fleet's personnel." "The ways to resolve this issue were determined at the highest level, and what remains now is to reach agreement on the order of implementing what was planned," he said.

The problems existing in relations between Russia and Ukraine "must not be driven into a corner; they must be resolved fairly, on the path of friendship and cooperation," the diplomat stressed. "Both nations want it," Dubinin said. Russia's Foreign Ministry believes that it is imperative to implement all the agreements reached earlier between Russia and Ukraine, he pointed out.

More detailed information may be found in IF's [INTERFAX] January 31 issue of Diplomatic Panorama.

### Military Shipbuilding Factory Builds Timber Carriers

OW3101142994 Vladivostok Radiostantsiya Tikhiy Okean Maritime Network in Russian 0815 GMT  
18 Jan 94

[From the "Pacific Ocean" Program]

[Text] The Far East Maritime Steamship Joint Stock Company signed a contract for building eight timber-carrying vessels with the Komsomolsk-na-Amure shipbuilding factory, which previously built only military ships and nuclear and diesel submarines. It is expected that the steamship company will sign another contract with the same factory for building another eight timber-carrying vessels.



**Dubin in Further Arms Negotiations With Ukraine***LD3101175194 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1644 GMT 31 Jan 94*

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**Commentary on Missile Detargeting***PM2601124594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Jan 94 First Edition p 1*

[Military observer Vladimir Klimov "Topical Commentary:" "Where Are Missiles Targeted?"]

[Excerpts] Hamlet's question "To be or not to be?" remains the main question of the day. I was surely not the only one to think so on learning that the Russian and U.S. presidents had announced the detargeting of strategic missiles in the Moscow declaration.

"For the first time since the beginning of the nuclear era our countries have stopped targeting missiles at each other," Major General Anatoliy Svetikov, deputy chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces Staff Directorate, believes. [passage omitted]

Yet the past is still with us. The following questions have arisen from there, from the alarming past: Is the retargeting of missiles and their return to their former condition possible and how long would this take? Let us allow the specialist, Maj. Gen. Svetikov, to speak:

"The process of introducing and scrapping missions operates on many levels and planes. It varies for different categories and types of missile. The scrapping of missions will depend on the principle chosen by the two countries' presidents. As regards resumption, I can say that as long as a missile is on alert status there is always

a possibility of returning everything to its former place. How long will this take? Long enough, although the times vary for different categories and types of missile. I do not intend to talk about time periods but have singled out the most important thing: the implementation of the presidents' decision sharply reduces the threshold of a nuclear strike."

How nice it would be to put a period after such an optimistic conclusion and to exclaim joyfully "The End!" Alas, there is still a long way to go before the end; dreams about a complete ban on nuclear weapons still remain dreams. The nuclear danger comes not from across the ocean but from Russia's doorstep—Ukraine. Its president pledged to transport nuclear warheads to us for dismantling. But some of them are already in a critical condition.

Yet again we have to talk of the unreasonableness of certain vociferous politicians. Specialists, foreseeing the complexities with missiles, made an agreement about centralized maintenance of them. But some Ukrainian deputies saw Moscow's evil hand in this too. The agreements, which did not need parliament's ratification, were blocked by it. We, they said, will overcome.

But how can routine inspection and maintenance work and the maintenance of missile complexes be undertaken when there are not enough resources or specialists? The result of the deputies' veto is the alarming technical condition of missiles in Ukraine. Following inspection, warheads were removed from some missile launchers which had simply become dangerous.

Hamlet's question has now crystallized over these missile silos. How will people answer it?

**Joint Venture With U.S. To Earn \$600 Million in Contracts***MK1301121094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian  
13 Jan 94 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "Space Firms Cooperate To Keep a Launch Program Going Till the Year 2000"]

[Text] Anatoliy Kiselev, general director of the Khrunichev State Space Scientific-Production Center and member of the board of directors of the Russian-U.S. "Lockheed-Khrunichev-Energiya" joint venture, said that thanks to their cooperation "in the past 12 months we managed to sign nine commercial contracts for launching Western companies' satellites with the Russian 'Proton' system. The total amount of the contracts exceeds \$600 million." According to the general director, the cooperation with the partners, who have taken over the marketing of Russia's most powerful rocket in service and also the licensing of Western firms' space vehicles, enabled the center "fully to book the program of space launches till the year 2000 and to look to the future with optimism."

**CFE Inspections: 'No Discrepancies' in Moscow**

PM1301143394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 13 Jan 94 p 1

[Aleksandr Oliynik report under the "Yesterday" rubric:  
"Checks Revealed No Violations"]

[Text] During 1993 15 foreign inspection groups, from among other places the United States, Spain, the FRG, Britain, Italy, Norway, and Switzerland, worked at combined units and other units of the Moscow Military District in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

These inspections involved visits to troop deployment locations and installations where arms and ammunition are stored; they found no discrepancies between the district's stated stock of armaments and those actually found to be there.

**Need for Agreement on Missile Warning System Cited**

PM1101102194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 10 Jan 94 p 2

[Oleg Falichev article: "View of the Problem. The President's Eyes and Ears, or How the Missile Attack Early Warning System Operates Following the Breakup of the USSR"—passages between slantlines published in bold-face]

[Text] The top-secret missile attack early warning system [MAEW] was certainly assigned a special role among the strategic deterrence systems developed in the USSR during the Cold War years. Why? It provided the president, the country's military-political leadership, and the command of the branches of the Armed Forces with the information needed to adopt a definitive decision regarding the use of nuclear missile forces. That is, it can be said to have been in the direct sense of the word the eyes and ears of the country's leadership.

Today the Cold War is behind us. The Soviet Union does not exist. Many over-the-horizon [OTH] tracking stations, the basis of the MAEW, have ended up over the border. Lastly the geopolitical position of Russia itself has changed. How has all this affected the combat readiness of the system and the lives and service of the troops?

Here we are on the outskirts of Moscow. The trees are covered with snow. An outwardly unremarkable building, which has so to speak been legendary for many years. This is an MAEW command post, and no journalist has set foot inside it in its entire existence.

Inside the light is dim and the duty shift wear soft footwear. There are telephones to the defense minister and the chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff on the duty officer's desk.... Opposite stands a huge panel, the size of the screen at Moscow's "Rossiya" Movie Theater, indicating the operational

situation, the movement of space objects, and the status and operation of OTH tracking stations tracking near-earth space, satellites in near-earth orbit, and all launches of carrier missiles that come within the zone of visibility.... Figuratively speaking, the key to our strategic security is here in this room....

It is here that the alarming inscription suddenly flashes from time to time (for training purposes): "Stand by. Launch. Missile Attack." Whereupon it gives the launch site, the number of missiles, and where they are targeted.... This information automatically enters the special "Krokus" device which is then used to activate the "nuclear attache case" held by the country's president. At the same time it is accompanied by an audio signal, which was said to have irritated M. Gorbachev a great deal. This is said to have ended in the "Krokus" being rapidly removed from his office.

As for the people stationed at the command post day and night (the duty officer, the systems analysts, and officers in the analytical service...), throughout the Cold War they were destined to be the first to learn of the start of the nuclear apocalypse. Cynical as it sounds, their job is to anticipate nuclear war.

Information comes into the multicolored command post panel today from eight MAEW stations, five of them located abroad: in Ukraine (Mukachevo and Sevastopol), Azerbaijan (Mingecheur), Kazakhstan (Balkhash), and Latvia (Skrunde). They are still providing information, but what guarantee is there that it will not suddenly stop one fine day?

From KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's file.

The development and creation of OTH MAEW and space surveillance radars began in our country in the sixties at the USSR Academy of Sciences Radiotechnical Research Institute under the leadership of Academician A.L. Mints. The first "Dnepr" stations were deployed in Kazakhstan and Siberia, forming a tight radar barrier 5,000km long ensuring the accurate detection and tracking of space objects. During the seventies it proved possible to expand the radar field by including stations in the polar region, Latvia, and Ukraine.

A plan was then developed for total, continuous OTH coverage in the missile-vulnerable western, south-western, southern, and northeastern sectors. At the same time work was also under way on a fundamentally new phased-array OTH radar station called "Daryal"....

As we can see, the system was progressively built in missile-vulnerable areas. Needless to say, at the time no one thought that the Union would break up and that the radar field erected would be bisected by the national borders of sovereign states. Or that they would de facto end up under Russia's "nuclear umbrella." However, now the question is this: Do the republics need these services today? And, if so, on what terms? If not, what is to be done with the stations?

Regrettably these are not idle questions, since there are still no clear accords in this sphere or clear prospects. Admittedly there is the Treaty on Collective Security signed by six CIS states. But "nothing is forever".... Remember the promises about the unified ruble, economic, and information area. What has happened to all that? Is it true that the future of these stations and maybe the future of the MAEW is today being decided not only in Moscow but also in the CIS nation states?

...The Balkhash area, where an MAEW unit is stationed, greeted us with cold gusts of wind and snow. A strange building like a gigantic hut rose above the wild semi-desert.

"Our new 'Daryal' looks strange and, you'll agree, impressive," Colonel G. Kozlyuk, deputy commander for work with personnel, broke into my thoughts. "The only thing is that the construction workers and fitters are unable to hand it over. So at the moment we are working with a 'Dnepr'."

Vast sums of money at the old prices have been invested in the station—around 1 billion rubles. It is a reliable radar. It has triple-redundant technological apparatus, several independent power sources, and space, radio, and facsimile communications.... It provides highly important information about ballistic missile launches, identifies objects during the booster phase of their flight path, and can instantly compute warheads' launch and landing sites as well as their flight time....

"We provided backup for the 'Soyuz-Apollo' flight and all flights from Baykonur and obtained information on 'Ferre' [as transliterated], 'Columbia,' and the shuttle," Colonel N. Buchuk, deputy commander for arms, said not without pride.

The MAEW has never given a false alarm regarding a missile attack (unlike its U.S. counterpart). But the "Dnepr's" have virtually outlived their service life, working continuously throughout this period.

It became clear that the almost complete new "Daryal" station is not at its best.

"Everything is vague now," Deputy Chief Designer Yu. Konkin, who leads a wretched life here now with an uncertain future, told me. "So it is not surprising if the equipment gradually gets neglected...."

Regrettably, signs of this neglect are already striking, to wit "explosive" old electric cable in the living quarters, empty shelves in the military trading store, the boarded-up windows of empty apartments, and the lack of clear guarantees for the officers that they will be provided with amenities in Russia.... Major General Yu. Kabakov, army deputy commander for rear services, involuntarily added to the picture by citing the following figure: "Compared with past conditions, supplies to our units in neighboring countries have dropped by around 40 percent, although the tasks have remained the same."

The various restrictions on the movement of freight and property and the confusion over supplies represent another barrier. In terms of some categories the unit remains on Kazakhstan's payroll, whereas as far as others are concerned it has been transferred to the Ural Military District. Realistically at the moment the unit doesn't know whether it is coming or going. And virtually everything—from uniform badges to pipes—has to be brought by air from Moscow. You can imagine the kind of megabucks this costs, but there is evidently no other option at the moment.

Needless to say all this cannot fail to affect the people, their mood, and ultimately their attitude to their work.

It is becoming more and more difficult to get replacements for these units from Russia, Colonel Ye. Tokarev, head of the army cadre department, thinks. Nonetheless at the moment, we would stress, all this is only indirectly affecting the unit's combat readiness. A commission from the Center led by Major General V. Pronov, the formation's chief of staff, came here to work and pointed to the reliability of the whole complex. It investigated a great deal and set a great deal to rights, so to speak. The unit received good marks, but its status remains unchanged. "We have no future here....," one officer told me bluntly.

Why is that happening in our country? The people who have to "pull" the strategic installation out of the mire without receiving proper pay, in many respects through personal initiative and self-restraint, should be rewarded, but they "have no future." Why did we make such a mess of the identical installation in Krasnoyarsk, owing to then Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze's, so to speak, tractability and under press are from the Americans, and why are we now turning it into...a furniture factory? At a time when the United States has not just failed to mothball its long-range tracking radar in Greenland but has even modernized it and has absolutely no intention of cutting back its other stations.

From the KRASNAYA ZVEZDA file:

The U.S. BMEWS ballistic missile early warning system is established and operating. It comprises three posts on Fylingdales Moor (Britain), in Thule (Greenland), and in Clear (Alaska), which have been modernized in recent years to enable the system to detect missiles at long range. This system uses a multifunctional Precision Approach Radar station comprising a "Safeguard" ABM defense system. During the eighties more powerful assemblies of the Pave Paws OTH stations were deployed on U.S. eastern and western seaboard and southern borders. The NORAD command post in Colorado Springs exercises operational control of the entire nuclear missile early warning system.

There is also a first-echelon tracking missile launches and engaged in nuclear burst fix acquisition—five "IMEWS-2" artificial earth satellites in orbit at distances of 30,000-40,000 km. This system still monitors the entire surface of our planet, including Russia and the



CIS. And in spring 1993 during the Western European Union's military and scientific conference the question was raised of creating a European ABM defense system (EUROWISAT) combined with similar U.S. systems. Its deployment is scheduled for the year 2005.

So the breakup of the Union cannot so far be said to have had any effect on the MAEW. But there are problems, as we can see. Above all, the question of the status of MAEW units abroad needs to be resolved most speedily. Regrettably, everything is not as easy as we would like. Kazakhstan, for instance, has a bone to pick with the Russian military over use of its airspace, fulfillment of customs regulations, etc. But that is not the main thing. Major General A. Kasymov, chief of the Main Staff of the Kazakhstan Armed Forces, gave his view of the problem as follows: "The question of the future of the MAEW unit is in my view linked to the question of Kazakhstan's accession to the 1972 ABM Treaty. We know the Russian Federation's stance: People say that Kazakhstan cannot be a party to the treaty because it does not have the status of a nuclear state.... But this treaty must be reviewed today to take account of the opinions of states with elements of the strategic nuclear forces stationed on their territory. It is therefore necessary to lay down new conditions for the creation of the 'nuclear club,' either on a multilateral basis or on a bilateral basis with Russia. And to record these in a corresponding protocol like the Lisbon Protocol...."

S. Tyurin, Russian consul in Kazakhstan, is inclined to think that Russia should be quicker in making up its mind about the status of the MAEW military unit in Kazakhstan: "I am not a military man, but I believe that this unit is a very important installation, spearheading scientific and technical progress. And failure to pay attention to it will cause us a setback just like the earlier setback with Baykonur in terms of the space program. At the moment—this is a fact—the military are surviving here as best they can. You cannot describe them as occupiers, since their main weapon is radar equipment...."

Everyday material and technical difficulties are a minor misfortune. It is their uncertain status that is causing discord among the officers and the personnel. The republic has after all adopted a law laying down that anyone who does not apply for other citizenship by 1 March automatically becomes a citizen of Kazakhstan.... So you can understand their position. And, moreover, that of their wives and school-age children, who are not particularly enthusiastic about the need for mandatory study of the Kazakh language in local schools or about obtaining secondary education certificates here. Not to mention the fact that there are Kazakhstani security and prosecutor's office organs at the garrison.... Colonel General (Retired) Yu. Votintsev, one of the people who developed the MAEW system, believes that a sorry fate lies in store for these installations if the problems are not resolved. "The outdated 'Dnepr' stations will be able to operate for another two or three years, six years at most, and then the whole Commonwealth will be left without

some of the most accurate means of detecting attacking missiles." However, owing to the dismantling of the Krasnoyarsk radar a gap has already formed in our OTH tracking systems in the northeast of the country. Therefore logic itself suggests that it is necessary to at least preserve what is left.

"The point is that the highly effective system only works when it receives information from all OTH tracking stations. It would therefore evidently be right for the MAEW to be not a national but a supranational system," Lieutenant General S. Sokolov, MAEW army commander, said. "But, naturally, with other CIS countries taking a shared financial part in running it."

The Main Staff of the Air Defense Troops takes a similar view.

"Whether we need this installation or not is not under discussion," Colonel General V. Smirnov, commander of the missile-space defense troops, said. "But, in order to resolve the problems arising there, an agreement is first needed on Russian-Kazakhstani military cooperation—an agreement which is not yet in place."

Well, this would evidently be the optimum solution to the very difficult situation that has developed since the breakup of the USSR as far as preserving the MAEW installations is concerned. It is after all easy to destroy things—something that we have repeatedly seen over the last few years—but it is hard to create them. The MAEW embodied the best achievements of many generations' intellectual potential. And, however stable the world may be today, it was, is, and remains a crucial deterrent against the unleashing of a nuclear missile war.

A final point. A session of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Collegium was held recently. It analyzed the results of the Russian Federation's military cooperation with neighboring states and identified tasks for 1994. It was stressed that, as a result of joint work on the part of the Russian Federation Defense and Foreign Ministries, a normative-legal base has by and large been created for military-political and military-technical cooperation with the republics of the former USSR. It was pointed out at the same time that, in view of Russia's strategic interests in this sphere, there are still plenty of unresolved questions.

It only remains to hope that the necessary decisions on strategic arms will not be shelved. After all, the fate of the military and their relatives and friends depends on them. And ultimately the reliability of Russia's defense itself.

Nonetheless at the moment, we would stress, all this is only indirectly affecting the unit's combat readiness. A commission from the Center led by Major General V. Pronov, the formation's chief of staff, came here to work and pointed to the reliability of the whole complex. It investigated a great deal and set a great deal to rights, so



to speak. The unit received good marks, but its status remains unchanged. "We have no future here..." one officer told me bluntly.

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### Problems of Nuclear Missile Maintenance

PM0701165594 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 2

[Aleksandr Dolinin "Reportage for This Issue": "First Aid' for Missiles"—first three paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] Hundreds of ballistic missiles "held" by the Strategic Missile Forces are on alert duty in Russia. Russian missilemen also have a headache over the launchers stationed in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. They have plenty of trouble with this whole "nuclear missile business."

Missiles, which are packed full of electronics and fuel and have nuclear warheads, require constant surveillance and care, particularly in the event of the aging and the malfunctions which are making themselves felt increasingly clearly today, given the meager funding, depleted spare parts, tools, and accessories kits, the destroyed collaboration within the former Union, the customs obstacles....

In these conditions specialists locally and at the operational-technical control center of the Strategic Missile Forces, which our correspondent visited, are operating a "first aid" system.

Operational-technical control centers appeared in the Strategic Missile Forces High Command and in missile large strategic formations and combined units several years ago. They proved their viability in auspicious times, and in the present times—with universal shortages—they have proved simply essential.

"Such a center in the Strategic Missile Forces High Command," Lieutenant General Vladimir Nikitin, deputy commander in chief, believes, "is the eyes and ears of the forces' leadership. Here measures are taken to rectify the simplest fault in missile hardware and, if necessary, major technical decisions are worked out."

The center itself is housed in small, well-equipped premises. Nothing here is superfluous. Showing me round his facility, Lt. Colonel Mikhail Poludnitsyn, the center's chief, drew attention to the alert-duty personnel's posts and the collective electronic panel. The latter highlights information on the faults which have arisen, down to each individual launcher, gives their characteristics, and shows the time of reinstatement of "indisposed" missiles and protection systems. All this is conveyed via a computer link to the display units of chiefs of directorates and services.

The alert-duty personnel are headed by Col. Yuri Surnin, who is assisted by two Alekseys—Captain Kotlyarevskiy and Senior Lt. Klychnikov. Col. Vladimir Bezgreshnov, preparing to take Surnin's place, unhurriedly bones up on the situation. Engineers are on duty round the clock, being operationally subordinate to the Strategic Missile Forces Central Command Post.

I asked Surnin to assess the condition of the missile armament and hardware over the past 24 hours.

"Twenty launchers (more than half of them outside Russia) required prompt [operativnyy] intervention," he said. "On one, for example, an instrument has failed." On this score he reported: Measures have been taken, and the instrument is being delivered to the launcher by courier from a store in one of the divisions. The alert-duty personnel knew the train's number and were monitoring the officer's time of arrival in the unit and the hardware's readiness to receive him.

"We strive for stability, operational efficiency, secrecy, and continuity in the center's activity," Lt. Col. Poludnitsyn emphasized.

This is achieved not only by constant alert duty but also by means of the planning meetings conducted on a daily basis by Lt. Gen. Anatoliy Perminov, chief of the Main Directorate for the Operation of Missile Armament, and on Saturdays by Lt. Gen. Vladimir Nikitin, deputy commander in chief, directly at the operational-technical control center.

Invited to the meetings are leading specialists of main directorates and officers of the state technical supervision, communications, the motor vehicle service.... Such representation has entirely justified itself. This staff of professionals resolves all problems. It is only when these fall outside the competence of the deputy commander in chief that direct application is made to the commander in chief of the Strategic Missile Forces himself.

The Saturday conference at the center was held in a calm working regime, but you could sense the anxiety and inner tension of the people gathered there. There are quite a few problems in Russia, so it turned out, and things are still more difficult in the event of equipment malfunctions in Ukraine. There are more malfunctions in just two missile divisions there than in all the Missile Forces. Technical decisions on them have been worked out in good time, and the Ukrainian side has not rejected

them; but it cannot implement them. There are not the material and financial means or even the fuel to enable the routine inspection and maintenance crews to travel to the launchers.

Problems also arise in the divisions in Kazakhstan. For example, instruments intended for the automated systems for the protection of nuclear weapons are not allowed through customs. Whether they like it or not, the "technical personnel" are also required to be diplomats and prepare requests to the Main Customs Administration.

On visiting the operational-technical control center I saw for myself that an unwritten law exists among the missilemen: Don't leave a missile until a malfunction has been rectified. Those on duty in the control center and those who work with a wrench directly in a combat position really are like "first aid" for nuclear missile weapons.

#### Grachev Talks With Senators Nunn, Lugar

PM0601094394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA  
in Russian 6 Jan 94 p 1

[Mikhail Pogorelyy report: "Russia Ready for Cooperation"]

[Text] Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian defense minister, received U.S. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, who are visiting Russia, 5 January. During the conversation they touched on the state of and prospects for Russian-U.S. military cooperation. The increase in the intensity of ties in this sphere is indicated by the fact that last year there were 17 major events related to establishing cooperation between the two states' armed forces and another 26 are scheduled for the coming year.

At the U.S. senators' request Army Gen. Pavel Grachev told them about the features of Russia's new military doctrine. In particular he stressed that it is no coincidence that there is no reference in the "Basic Provisions of Russian Federation Military Doctrine" to Russia not being the first to use nuclear weapons. First, the corresponding U.S., British, and French documents contain no such provision. Second, such a pledge on our part did not enable nuclear weapons to be regarded as a means of averting war and a factor for deterring a potential aggressor.

The Russian defense minister described Russia's attitude to the "Partnership for Peace" idea mooted by the United States by saying the following: "We are ready to support the idea insofar as it considers the security interests of all states without exception" and if it is based on an all-Europe rather than a bloc system of security. As we see it, Pavel Grachev pointed out, true partnership means developing political dialogue, regular consultations, and reaching agreed positions, and this activity may culminate in coordinated practical actions. Russia is ready for that kind of cooperation.

During the meeting they also discussed questions of cooperation in nuclear disarmament and housing construction for servicemen, in particular servicemen from the troops being withdrawn from Germany and the Baltic states. There was also a detailed discussion of Ukrainian and North Korean nuclear policy and Russia's view of these problems.

Colonel General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces; Andrey Kokoshin, Russian first deputy defense minister; and, on the U.S. side, Thomas Pickering, U.S. ambassador to Russia, took part in the conversation.

It is somewhat symbolic that on the same day the Russian and U.S. defense ministers had their first conversation over the direct telephone line connecting the offices of the heads of the two countries' military departments. Henceforth it will be easier and quicker to resolve urgent "burning" problems. Another step has been taken toward developing military cooperation.

#### BELARUS

##### Cash Shortage Hits Arms Destruction Program

PM1201142194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
31 Dec 93 First Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Shalnev report: "\$2,000 To Cut Up One Tank"]

[Text] Minsk—The repair plant at Borisov, some 80 km outside Minsk, had almost shut down completely a week ago. There was no electricity.

So what's new?! This kind of thing happens in Belarus all the time: Many plants are standing idle or working at 50-percent capacity.

But Repair Plant No. 140 in Borisov is a special plant. Special, because it is carrying out an extraordinary order: It is cutting up tanks and other combat equipment which Belarus has been instructed to destroy under the terms of the treaty on reducing arms in Europe. When the treaty was signed, Belarus was still Belorussia and the tanks were Soviet. But everything had changed when the treaty came into force, the main difference being that it was now up to Minsk, rather than Moscow, to pay for the tanks and their destruction.

Cutting up a tank is expensive. As Colonel Mikhail Volochko from the National Monitoring and Inspections Agency told me, \$2,000 per tank is the bare minimum. But Belarus is committed to destroying 1,873 of them within 40 months of the treaty's coming into force, that is, by the beginning of 1996.

Minsk itself must find the money to destroy these tanks. There are no charity organizations, and no special funds are envisaged. So where is the money to come from? So far it has been provided by the Defense Ministry. From which sources? From the most "expendable": Those

intended as allocations to meet the needs of officers and warrant officers, provide them with social facilities, and build them the most basic accommodations.

But the Defense Ministry's budget is not so much hovering on the brink: It is simply in a state of collapse. If the money had been available, under no circumstances would it have allowed the repair plant in Borisov to be shut down. It will be started up again, of course, as there is no alternative but to scrape together the necessary funds to cut another 102 tanks and 49 armored vehicles into pieces by 12 January, as envisaged by the current stage in the implementation of the treaty.

"But what if the plan is not fulfilled? What will happen if these commitments are left hanging in the air?" I asked members of the military and politicians. "Will sanctions be applied to Belarus?"

No overt sanctions are envisaged, it was explained to me, although covert sanctions are a possibility: For example, an agreement on economic or commercial cooperation in which Minsk is particularly interested could suddenly, at the very last moment just before signing, be set aside "for final touches and adjustments."

The military and the Belarusian Foreign Ministry estimate that the republic needs at least \$33 million if it is to honor the commitments to which the Soviet Union set its signature—namely, to destroy tanks, armored personnel carriers, aircraft, and other military equipment—within the deadline and to the standard set, that is, without prompting criticism from NATO inspectors and monitors. I repeat: This kind of money cannot be found in the republic budget, not even by making still more draconian public spending cuts. Hence the task to which, as Foreign Minister Petr Kravchanka told me, Belarusian diplomats are devoting paramount attention: The task of finding these \$33 million. Where are they looking? Abroad mainly.

One would have thought nothing could be simpler: For example, the United States has long had a law named after its authors, Senators Nunn and Lugar, which provides for giving substantial aid to some of the former Soviet republics for the purpose of their demilitarization. Almost \$800 million has been assigned, of which more than \$70 million is due to Belarus.

But the problem is that this money is primarily "nuclear," that is, it is earmarked for nuclear demilitarization and actually has nothing to do with conventional weapons, such as tanks and armored vehicles. Nunn and Lugar are perfectly willing to allocate—and are allocating—\$25 million to ensure the "environmental regeneration" of places in Belarus where strategic missile forces used to be stationed, but Minsk can go whistle as far as help with destroying tanks is concerned. Incidentally, I came across a very interesting report in a Minsk newspaper recently: A high-security corrective labor colony is opening on the site of a disbanded missile unit in Ivatsevichskiy Rayon. It will have room for 2,000 prisoners. The report did not make clear, however,

whether this is the "environmental regeneration" referred to in the Nunn-Lugar law, and, if it is, what sum the senators have allocated for this specific project.

It seems to me that this U.S. law and similar laws in other countries need some modifications and amendments. Obviously you must not look a gift horse in the mouth and so forth, but, if you think about it, it is probably far more important for Belarus to prevent the total breakdown of social programs for military servicemen at present than to implement in full and in a short space of time some of the provisions of nuclear demilitarization. Naturally, I am not suggesting any slowing down of pace, even the slightest, as far as the dismantling of nuclear warheads is concerned; in this regard, everything must go strictly according to schedule (for your information: Tactical nuclear weapons were removed from Belarus over a year ago, and 80 strategic missiles with 175 warheads remain). But it would certainly make sense to try to somehow rethink the secondary or tertiary elements in the demilitarization program: Either in terms of rearranging priorities or even in terms of putting resources to more economical use.

People in Belarus are grumbling. Military and civilians alike. Some quite openly, others in private or in Aesopian terms, because of their statutory obligations. They are grumbling about the fact that demilitarization is being implemented not just rigidly, but sometimes even inanely. It is ironic that the Soviet Union's economy was killed by militarization, while the post-Soviet republics' economy is being strangled by the reverse process. If the situation in the Belarusian economy were just a little better than it is now—people do not leave the repair plant in Borisov, which used to be considered a prestigious establishment but now stands idle more and more often, simply because there is nowhere to go (many other plants are closed indefinitely)—the reaction to the need for Belarus to honor its international commitments would be different, more understanding.

There is no doubt that the weapons in question must be disposed of, especially those which were dumped in Belarus by the previous power, which never troubled to find out the opinion of Belarus and its people. But perhaps it would be worth thinking about ways to ensure that the demilitarization process does not kill the economy before it has a chance to stand on its own feet and move in the direction of a real market system and that the disarmament of Belarus does not lead to social upheavals? Of course, if the \$33 million are found, or even \$20 million, it will be much easier. But if not? In that case, it would certainly be worth raising the question of postponing the destruction of weapons and spreading the schedule over several months or even over a year or so. In what, ultimately, does the West have a vested interest? In a country crushed by the weight of its economic problems, but with not a single superfluous tank left exactly 40 months from now and not a day later? Or in a country with a more or less acceptable economy and, consequently, political stability, but with



a superfluous 200-300 armored vehicles, which will nevertheless be cut into pieces, albeit not immediately, but after a small delay?

The fact that Belarus takes extremely seriously the commitments made on its behalf by others is not in any doubt. I think this is partly the reason why only Minsk, apart from Moscow, features on the itinerary of President William Clinton's forthcoming visit to the former Soviet Union in January.

But the United States is not top of Belarus' list of foreign policy priorities. Russia comes first. This is clear from a draft of the republic's basic foreign policy concepts, a document which must be discussed in the Supreme Soviet in the very near future. At the moment, it is stamped "secret," the point of which no one I spoke to could explain, apart from one, perhaps, who said: "If the discussion were conducted openly and broadcast live, we would distract and agitate people. Then parliamentarians could say such slanderous things about other countries during the debates that it would cause a scandal."

I did nevertheless manage to find out something about the secret document's contents. First, the list of priorities. It is as follows: Russia, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, the United States, France, Britain, Italy, Austria, Scandinavia, China, India, Japan, and the gas- and oil-extracting CIS countries. I was told that, a year ago, the Supreme Soviet would not have placed Russia at the top of the list: Europe would have been there instead. Second, the document confirms the provision of the Belarusian Constitution which states that the Supreme Soviet determines the direction taken by foreign policy and adopts decisions on fundamental issues. This means that the government and, in particular, the Foreign Ministry are assigned a subsidiary role.

Be that as it may, the draft of the basic concepts has in fact survived all the various stages of coordination and agreement, including in the diplomatic department, which has not bothered to kick up a fuss about the Supreme Soviet being allowed to call the shots. Why not? Probably because, as the Foreign Ministry and the Supreme Soviet itself realize perfectly well, this document is "short-lived," designed to last one or two years at most. Also, in a situation where, to quote Ivan Tereshko, chairman of the Supreme Soviet International Affairs Commission, "we are simply flying headlong," there is no point thinking about something more permanent and stable or drawing up long-term foreign policy concepts.

But the document does have one obvious positive quality: It must defuse the tension which has developed around the Foreign Ministry in the last 12-18 months and which has manifested itself, in particular, in relations with the Supreme Soviet leadership; relations marked, as one can judge from reports of parliamentary debates, by accusations and counteraccusations of unprofessionalism, incompetence, and lack of preparation; relations giving cause to say—as Zenon Poznyak,

leader of the opposition in parliament, did say in a conversation with me—that "Belarus has no foreign policy as such."

I am convinced of the opposite: Belarus certainly does have a foreign policy. A foreign policy with very clear guidelines and objectives, which is particularly important. This is evident even from the list of priorities, which does not feature abstract discussions about common human values, but the specific interests of Belarus itself, which is striving to understand what is happening in the countries closest to it, as it is there that its interests are affected in a direct and powerful way.

Even when Repair Plant No. 140 in Borisov, deprived of electricity, will get back on its feet....

### **Latest Round of Destruction of Military Equipment Begins**

*LD1401151794 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1416 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Leonid Tratsevskiy for TASS]

[Text] Minsk, 14 January—The latest round of destruction of armoured military equipment, which Belarus is destroying in accordance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, has begun at the Borisov tank maintenance plant. This has been verified by a NATO military inspection from the Kingdom of Belgium, in which experts from the other states of the North Atlantic alliance were also represented, as is customary. Foreign monitors inspected and counted up all the equipment due for destruction between 13 January and 24 February. More than 90 tanks and about 50 infantry fighting vehicles will be cut up for scrap and partially re-equipped as vehicles for use in the national economy.

### **Uranium Compensation Still Under Negotiation**

*WS2501204494 Minsk ZVYAZDA in Belarusian 20 Jan 94 p 1*

[Report by BELAPAN correspondent Ales Lipay: "Dollars for Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Petr Krawchanka has confirmed in an interview with BELAPAN that the issue of compensation for uranium recovered from nuclear warheads transferred from Belarus to Russia remains in the "process of negotiations," in which five states are participating.

When the media, noted P. Krawchanka, report that such compensation will total \$12 billion, I laugh at such dilettantism. This is a sum which must be divided between four CIS countries. However, it will not be paid at one time, but rather over the course of several years. Today, it is even hard to say when the United States will begin to buy the uranium from Russia, added the minister.

## KAZAKHSTAN

**Foreign Minister Denies Revision of Nuclear-Free Status**

LD3101155394 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1530 GMT 31 Jan 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondents Vladimir Akimov and Amangeldiy Akhmetlimov]

[Text] Almaty January 31 TASS— The foreign minister of Kazakhstan denied allegations that his country is revising its nuclear-free status and said republican authorities will probe all circumstances which led to a publication in the Iranian "JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" newspaper which said that the Central Asian republic will not give up its nuclear arsenal.

"This is a newspaper canard which does not deserve any attention," Tuleutay Suleymenov said on Monday.

The newspaper quoted Kazakh Ambassador in Tehran Myrzatay Dzholdasbekov as saying that Kazakhstan does not intend to eliminate or relocate its nuclear weapons to any other place until non-use of such weapons is guaranteed at the world level and the planet gets rid of them.

It was stressed that this was the official position which was to be conveyed to the U.S. Administration during a visit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev to the United States which is to take place in two weeks.

Kazakhstan "joined the nuclear non-proliferation treaty last December and ratified it, as well as the Start I treaty," Suleymenov said adding that instruments of ratification will be exchanged with the United States during the visit of Nazarbayev in mid-February.

"Moreover, Kazakhstan together with Belarus made a considerable contribution to the work which was completed in Moscow by Presidents of Russia, the United States and Ukraine," Suleymenov said referring to the trilateral agreement according to which Ukraine gives up its nuclear weapons.

"Our republic never strived to be a nuclear state. It has experienced its deadly danger. Five hundred nuclear tests have been conducted at the Semipalatinsk range which is closed now. Hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs are still suffering from their aftermath and we all view disposing of the weapons as a benefit," the minister said. He added that Kazakh official authorities are trying to probe all the circumstances which resulted in the publication in "JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI" which "rudely distorted the republican position on nuclear weapons." Most evidently, the newspaper is guilty of wishful thinking, but it is not ruled out that the words of the ambassador were distorted for some reason.

**Unexploded Nuclear Device Left Under Semipalatinsk Site**

PM1401153194 Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA*  
in Russian 14 Jan 94 p 3

[Anatoliy Ladin report under the "Events and Commentary" rubric: "Will Nuclear Charge Be Left to Our Descendants as a Memento? Semipalatinsk Test Site Continues To Pose Questions"]

[Text] At a meeting between Tulegen Zhukeyev, state counselor of the Republic of Kazakhstan, and journalists discussion again turned to the future of a nuclear device prepared for testing at the Semipalatinsk test site but still in an underground gallery, as the test site has been closed to date under an edict of the president of Kazakhstan. Nuclear tests have accordingly ended.

What, then, will become of the nuclear charge? What is its future? Could a spontaneous underground nuclear explosion eventually occur? These and other questions are worrying people.

The state counselor thinks the nuclear charge should be neutralized. However, according to him, Kazakhstan is unable to do this itself. Only those who prepared the charge and placed it underground for testing are capable of doing it.

However, as we have learned from informed sources, the nuclear charge's removal from the gallery entails very complicated engineering operations. This is not only expensive, it is dangerous too, as it was never planned that the device would be removed. It was prepared only for detonation and was carefully sealed up.

We have heard from certain officers at the test site that destroying the charge in situ would be the simplest and most expedient solution. That is to say, detonate it and let that be an end to the matter, particularly as its yield compared with those detonated at the test site in previous years is not very great.

But a new problem is coming to a head. The military unit which provided support services for tests at the Semipalatinsk site is being disbanded. Shortly there will be no one to remove or detonate the charge, depending on which decision is made. Perhaps our descendants will be left this "surprise" as a keepsake?

**Accord on Baykonur Explained**

PM1101112994 Moscow *Russian Television Network*  
in Russian 1315 GMT 5 Jan 94

[From the "M-Trust" program: Video report by unnamed correspondent; figures in brackets denote broadcast time in GMT in hours, minutes, and seconds]

[Excerpts] [131957] [Correspondent over aerial shot of region] In December, on the eve of the New Year, the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan finally decided on a way of preserving the vital operational capacity of

the unique Baykonur Space Center complex. A recent press conference held at the Russian Space Agency was devoted to explaining the problems which have beset the multibillion industrial and scientific giant's 40-year history, and which are set to dog its present and its future. Baykonur started out as an isolated entity deep in the steppe heartland. Today, however, it is a whole state comprising impressive constructions, power-consuming plants, assembly buildings, and the city of Leninsk. Alongside the complex's famous No. 2 launchpad, the starting point for satellite launches, Gagarin's spaceflight, and indeed that of the cosmonauts currently in orbit—that is, alongside this living legend other launchpads have been constructed, including sites for the Proton and Energiya rockets. Many kilometers of cable worth billions of rubles have been invested in this site. And state-of-the-art technology is used in the rockets, the payloads, in work carried out in orbit, and in the help proffered from Earth. So Baykonur's separation from Russia's multifaceted space sector would result in a loss of resources and a dissipation of personnel and profitable contracts. The point being that the new super-complex being developed on the basis of Plesetsk is going to take between eight and 10 years to build. [passage omitted]

[132204] [Correspondent resumes over video of servicemen sitting on a bench] At the moment, Baykonur keeps going basically by dint of the fact that 28,000 Russian servicemen are there to operate it. For this reason it is hard to imagine any kind of commercial mechanism succeeding, be it a firm or a corporation. Frankly, to totally demilitarize Baykonur and replace military with civilian experts overnight would spell disaster. And talk of generating sufficient revenue on site for the giant Baykonur-Leninsk complex to pay its own way is little short of ridiculous. Russia is going to rent the entire complex from Kazakhstan, financially compensate for the ecological damage, and clear the 400,000 hectares of proving ground of scrap metal. However, this will not entail the billions of dollars which are being alluded to but will be done with due consideration for the overall state of accounts between Russia and Kazakhstan. Finally, at a time when 37 percent of Russia's space budget goes on maintaining the Mir space station, our participation in the new international space project—the "Alpha" Station—will create new jobs for tens of thousands of people and a billion dollars in profits in the next four years alone. Not to mention the production of new spacesuits in conjunction with the Germans, and of collapsible modules for India—in fact, contracts have been concluded with 20 states in all. And all this represents technology, profit, and prosperity. [132210] [Video shows shots of Baykonur, government representatives in conference, press conference, footage of Baykonur and surrounding area, space rockets, launchpads, spacecraft in orbit, cosmonauts, rocket launch, spacesuits]

## KYRGYZSTAN

### Prospect of U.S. Air Base in Kyrgyzstan Mooted

PM2401101994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 22 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Untitled report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA-  
"LOGOTIP"-KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA  
roundup under the general heading "What's New in CIS  
Countries?"]

[Text] According to information from an informed source, the prospects for locating a U.S. Air Force base in Kyrgyzstan within the framework of NATO are being studied at state level in the republic. In support of this account is the lively exchange of visits last year by NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner, former State Defense Committee Chairman Dzhanybek Umetaliyev, and other high-ranking officials. The projected base's location is for the moment being kept secret. Lieutenant Colonel A. Isayev, head of the Defense Ministry Press Center, who was approached to clarify the matter, neither confirmed nor denied this information.

## UKRAINE

### Ukraine Maneuvers Before 14 January Agreement Is Signed

#### Delegation Meets With Clinton

LD0601115594 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1100 GMT 6 Jan 94

[Text] U.S. President Bill Clinton received members of Ukraine's official working delegation, Deputy Prime Minister Valeriy Shmarov, Deputy Foreign Affairs Minister Borys Tarasyuk, and Oleh Bilorus, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Ukraine to the United States, in the White House. The conversation centered on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament issues. Questions of bilateral relations such as, in particular, stepping up cooperation between the two states in the sphere of the economy and U.S. assistance to Ukraine's defense industry in carrying out conversion, were also addressed.

Valeriy Shmarov expressed gratitude to President Clinton for the positive role the United States is playing in organizing and holding trilateral consultations between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in order to settle complex issues facing Ukraine in pursuing the course toward attaining nonnuclear status.

This was a report from the NOVYNY television and radio agency at the Ukrainian Foreign Affairs Ministry's press center.



### Department of Defense Denies 5-6 January Meeting With Russia

*LD0501215294 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2030 GMT 5 Jan 94*

[Text] Kiev—Speaking to a UNIAN correspondent, a representative of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense press centre denied Russian media reports (particularly those by ITAR-TASS and Ostankino) about Ukrainian-Russian military consultations in Kiev on the future fate of the nuclear arms deployed on the territory of Ukraine, allegedly due to start on 5 January with the participation of Defense Ministers Vitaliy Radetsky and Pavel Grachev. "The Ministry of Defense did not plan for such a meeting on 5-6 January," the press centre representative said. He added that work is in progress on preparations for a bilateral agreement on military cooperation, and Ukrainian-Russian military consultations on the issue were already held on 28-29 December in Moscow. According to an earlier UNIAN report, the Ukrainian delegation was led by Deputy Minister of Defense Ivan Oliynyk.

In the view of a high-ranking Ministry of Defense representative who would not give his name, a meeting of Ukrainian and Russian defense ministry delegations on the nuclear arms issue will be possible only after the problem is discussed by the presidents of both countries, or at least by government delegations.

### Foreign Ministry Statement 11 January

*WS1101155794 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1500 GMT 11 Jan 94*

[Text] A briefing was held today at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry in Kiev. Commenting on the possibility of signing any final document on eliminating nuclear arms on Ukrainian territory during the talks in Moscow between the U.S., Russian, and Ukrainian presidents—as hastily reported by Ostankino Television—and on a bilateral meeting between the Ukrainian and U.S. presidents, Yuriy Serheyev, chief of Foreign Ministry Information Department, in particular said:

[Begin Serheyev recording] As of today, I cannot say that a final document has already been drafted; I cannot say what form this document will take. That is why the scheduled tripartite conference in Moscow may have any form. If the final [draft] of the document is not completed, the Moscow conference is likely to be of consultative nature and aimed at coordinating aspects which still need to be coordinated. If the Moscow meeting manages to resolve uncoordinated issues, the document should take some form. I want to draw your attention to [word indistinct] commentaries, or I would rather say biased commentaries regarding the translation of Mr. Gore's statement which can be interpreted as an agreement or a treaty. As you see, at this stage, it is better to speak about a document rather than agreement or treaty.

[Serheyev continues] Discussions over the form and essence of this document are still continuing, in

Ukraine's governing circles as well. I want to stress that the Moscow summit will be preceded by a short meeting in Kiev. The possibility and likelihood of such a meeting were discussed very thoroughly through diplomatic channels. I also want to point out that as stated in yesterday's declaration by the Council of Ministers' and presidential press service, the main theme of the meeting will be the discussion of a wide range of issues concerning bilateral relations. This is very essential. Moreover, this statement is not unilateral; it was coordinated. There is a mutual desire on both sides to discuss bilateral relations at this meeting. This is not a bad example and not a bad result demonstrating that prospects are opening for a more constructive dialogue and more constructive relations with the United States in the spheres discussed in the course of Mr. Christopher's visit to Kiev. In particular [we should] balance our relations, direct them into the stream of military-political cooperation, and in the first place, economic cooperation. This visit once again emphasizes the attention paid Ukraine and importance of developing bilateral relations with her. Naturally, in the course of the [Kiev] meeting, issues tackled in Brussels and those to be tackled in Moscow will be discussed. [end recording]

### Party Leader Wants To Keep Nukes

*LD1101172294 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1551 GMT 11 Jan 94*

[Text] Kiev, 11 Jan—Anatoliy Shybiko, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian Republican Party, noted in an interview with a UNIAR correspondent that without having in front of him the agreement on liquidating Ukraine's nuclear arsenal and without understanding its point, it would be premature to give a preliminary assessment of this agreement. In his opinion, a final assessment of the agreement should be given only after a text of the agreement between Ukraine, Russia, and the United States becomes available. Mr. Shybiko is deeply convinced that Ukraine should remain a nuclear state for the near future and should accede to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons as a nuclear state.

### Kravchuk Confirms Intention To Sign Nuclear Pact in Moscow

*LD1201221994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2145 GMT 12 Jan 94*

[By UKRINFORM-TASS]

[Text] Kiev January 12 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk confirmed that he would fly to Moscow to sign on Friday an agreement with Russia and the United States which will oblige Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons inherited from the former Soviet Union.

"Ukraine will carry out its obligations and will not stand in the way of nuclear disarmament," Kravchuk told a press conference on Wednesday after talks with U.S. President Bill Clinton.



The U.S. President stressed that the Ukrainian decision to become nuclear free opens wide prospects for it in getting economic aid from various international financial institutions.

The "Partnership for Peace" plan provides Ukraine with a possibility to cooperate with the armed forces of the United States and NATO which will also promote Ukrainian security, according to Clinton.

The agreement will enhance the security of the three parties and the entire world, Clinton said.

Kravchuk thanked the U.S. President for his active promotion of cooperation between the two countries.

### **President Kravchuk Takes Lonely Stand After Tripartite Deal**

#### **Kravchuk Expresses 'Satisfaction' With Trilateral Agreement**

*LD1401122394 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[Text] Leonid Kravchuk today held a press conference.

[Begin Kravchuk recording] I express satisfaction with the meeting that took place today Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President Bill Clinton. This really is a historic moment. It opens up a new page in the resolution of such a global problem as nuclear weapons. I am pleased to stress that having signed these trilateral documents Ukraine, together with other states, in the interests of the peoples of Ukraine and Russia and of the whole of mankind, is going along the path of nuclear disarmament and, I would say, is one of the first to take this historic step. [end recording]

#### **Back in Kiev, Gives Press Conference**

*LD1501143094 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1720 GMT 14 Jan 94*

[News conference by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk with unidentified reporters in Kiev on 14 January—recorded]

[Text] **Reporter:** Can you say if the document that was signed by the three presidents in the Kremlin today will have to be ratified by the Ukrainian parliament? Will it help resolve the issue of disarmament in general, both in Europe and on CIS territory? Is this primarily a new step or not? Third, to what extent will it help Ukraine's economy?

**Kravchuk:** The document is a continuation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council resolutions. If you recall, the reservations that it put forth were about compensation for tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, their technical maintenance, financial and technical aid, and [security] guarantees. These, approximately, were the main reservations of the Supreme Council. When you read that document, and it will be published, you will find that all

of those demands were met. In other words, we can positively state that the executive branch has not been acting contrary to the Supreme Council resolutions but acting toward fulfilling the reservations put forth by the Supreme Council. I would like to emphasize this fact so that no one thinks, as some try to imply, that the president and the parliament were following their own separate courses. We did satisfy the reservations. I said in the past—and I am confirming it now—that we must join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This is my deep conviction, because everyone has already joined it—Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 131 countries. This is a normal step for Ukraine. This is why I hope that when we inform our parliament about our actions since December... [pauses] a very difficult time for Ukraine, which had to withstand pressure from all over the world. Not everyone understood our steps, not everyone understood our actions and there were grounds for this. This, I think, is a matter of principle. Now about your question as to who this document will serve. Both the talks with the U.S. President in Kiev and the trilateral talks have confirmed one irrefutable truth—problems can be resolved only on the path of compromises and agreements. No reservations, no guarantees expressed in documents or agreements or declarations or anything else will be realized if one or another state follows the policy of confrontation instead of compromise. If, for instance, Ukraine... [pauses] now they say that Ukraine has been brought to its knees. This is absurd. First, Ukraine has come out of the situation with credit. We will be compensated and given assistance; we will be respected politically and in other ways. If we had opposed the adopted course and stood in the way of nuclear disarmament—and it was anticipated—if Ukraine had failed to fulfill its obligations, it would have blocked the further development of nuclear disarmament. It would have blocked it. START II depends on the resolution of the START I issue. I hope that there will be START III as well, and the final goal will be achieved in the total dismantling of nuclear weapons on our planet. Thus, Ukraine, having resolved this issue, unblocked nuclear disarmament for the whole world, for all of humanity. By taking this step Ukraine testified to the fact that there are no separate paths for Ukraine—it follows the path of civilization and all human interest. This is the main issue for all the European and world community. By taking this step we have raised Ukraine's political prestige and image, we have confirmed that Ukraine's policies are predictable. [passage omitted]

**Reporter, HOLOS UKRAYINY newspaper:** Leonid Makarovych, I have a question. The answer to it concerns many people: Will our state's national security be consolidated after today's signing [of the trilateral agreement]? If so, what changes for the better can be expected?

**Kravchuk:** It will be consolidated in the following aspect: We have already experienced a completely different attitude toward Ukraine—from Russia, for example. You have seen a different attitude toward us by the

United States during the U.S. President's visit. I also have reports that NATO countries have come to understand Ukraine after receiving the bit of information which we still have to think over today. This way, the international environment and our neighbors have accepted Ukraine as a state that does not want evil but wants to live in friendship, partnership, and cooperation with other countries. This is the first point. Second, you understand that it is an illusion to say that the weapons we have owned were a deterrent. I have already told you about this deterrence; this is just a danger of deterrence rather than the deterrent [as received]. Because we are unable to produce, operate, restore, or service them—because we have nothing: neither industry nor testing grounds—what kind of deterrence can we talk about? This is an illusion of deterrence, but it was hammered into people's heads. The weapons have not been a guarantee of security, but a source of threat—and not only to Ukraine. This way, having won support from certain people and states, including powerful states, we have obtained security. Security does not mean signed documents. You know how many pacts have already been signed in history, how many other documents have been signed. However, they have been insufficient because a state policy has been against what has been signed. We want our policy to be implemented in real terms, in line with our civilized and anticipated concept, which has been approved. I am convinced that we have obtained security and opened the path to economic cooperation. We have also achieved a state's image. We have acted in line with our Supreme Council, and I am convinced that the majority of the people of Ukraine want this.

**Reporter:** At the recent news conference with Moldovan President Snegur you said something like this: The danger coming from the revanchist forces in Russia has increased. If such factors in the policy of our neighbor dominate, how do you think the signed agreement can be fulfilled and what mechanism of ensuring our national security do you see as the head of state?

**Kravchuk:** Well, first, I said this a little differently. I said I felt anxiety. [sentence indistinct] However, the words danger and anxiety have subtle differences in connotation. Danger means that this is somewhere here... [pauses] As far as anxiety is concerned, it is known to me, and every person must feel it when complicated processes are under way. However, I will repeat that this is not a state policy but a political trend. Political trends have occurred in history, you know about that. Let us take the last 300 years, and we will find different trends in all spheres of social life: spiritual and political spheres, and this is a normal democratic phenomenon. However, such a tendency must not become a state policy. To prevent this, we must cooperate first of all with Russia. There are 205 million of us in Russia and Ukraine. Difficult processes are under way in our country too. One should not attribute them only to Russia. They are everywhere. Revanchists, nationalists, national patriots reveal themselves everywhere; they are coming out,

because such is the time now. Let us prevent them from standing in the way of progressive development. This is a democratic way. However, to prevent this from becoming a state policy is our responsibility and our common concern. When we say that we have signed an agreement by three presidents today, this speaks volumes. Normal cooperation begins from this point: politically, economically, and spiritually. Those forces that today are in opposition will remain there. Opposition must exist, and there is nothing scary about this. However, one must not allow aggressiveness, and antipeople, antihumanitarian moods, hidden under patriotism, to dominate in society. We must not allow this. That is to say, I feel anxiety but I also have hope, because 14 January is a new page of understanding our problems, and a page comprised of new steps. I believe that these steps are aimed against what makes all of us apprehensive.

### Seeks Parliament's 'Understanding'

PM1401092594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
14 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[UNIAN's Mariya Starozhitskaya report for IZVESTIYA: "Kravchuk and Clinton Reach Agreement. Uncertain How Ukrainian Parliament Will Act"]

[Text] Kiev—"Temporary inconvenience equals improvement forever," Bill Clinton and Leonid Kravchuk gave a press conference next to this promising poster, which does, admittedly, pertain to repair work at Borispol Airport.

According to Leonid Kravchuk, this brief visit is as valuable as a long one. Bill Clinton said that the three countries' presidents are ready to sign an agreement on Friday that will commit Ukraine to eliminate the 176 ICBM's and around 1,500 nuclear warheads targeted against the United States and open up new forms of cooperation in the economy, politics, and security. "Let me give credit to President Kravchuk for his statesman-like way of thinking and his guidance in reaching this accord," he said.

However, the credit still has to be given: The U.S. President promised that he would take care to ensure that Ukraine receives most speedily the proper compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons that have already been taken to Russia and, in addition, that Ukraine gets a considerable amount of money for dismantling the weapons—money that can be used for defense and conversion. The United States pledged to help Ukraine during the difficult period of its transition to a market economy. In Kiev Clinton announced the creation of an enterprise support fund for Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus.

Ukraine's participation in the "Partnership for Peace" will provide additional guarantees that it can cooperate with the U.S. Armed Forces and with NATO countries, and Ukraine's decision to become a nuclear-free state will make it possible for it to obtain economic aid from

the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the G-7 countries.

"I believe that Ukraine cannot be confident of its security in the 21st century unless it is strong economically," Bill Clinton said.

The Ukrainian president decided to act without recourse to the parliament, which not so long ago even had a fair number of complaints to make about the START-I Treaty. "Philosophers say that everything in the world is changing and that you cannot step into the same river twice," Leonid Kravchuk said. "It is the same with the parliament: I hope that it will understand the crux of this global problem facing the world, the crux of our relations, and given the three states' mutual desire we will fulfill our commitments with its support."

The last session of the current Supreme Council next week could upset this: The accusation of "disarming" Ukraine is one that many people respond to, particularly during an election campaign. During Clinton's visit the youth faction of the People's Rukh demonstrated at the airport with the Ukrainian Students' Union. Boys stood under banners proclaiming "Careful, Clinton: First Crimea, then Alaska"; "Bill, would you disarm if you were in the same cage as a Russian bear?"; and "All Missiles to Zhirinovskiy?"

The last question is of interest to many Ukrainian inhabitants—it may be cleared up by the three president's meeting in Moscow.

#### 19 January TRUD Interview

PM1901153194 Moscow TRUD in Russian 19 Jan 94  
pp 1, 3

[Interview with Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk by Stanislav Prokopchuk; place, date not given: "Leonid Kravchuk: Let's Take Account of Today's Realities"]

[Excerpt] [passage on social problems, economy omitted]

**Prokopchuk:** By ratifying START I and the Lisbon Protocol with a number of substantial provisos did Ukraine not doom itself to a further, tighter credit blockade and uncompromising political pressure from the United States and other nuclear states?

**Kravchuk:** The Supreme Council decree includes provisos which are perfectly normal and natural, as they say. Yes, Ukraine is entitled to compensation for its nuclear weapons, Ukraine must have reliable guarantees of its security, Ukraine needs assistance to eliminate its nuclear weapons.

But the fact that the Supreme Council did not vote to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty is a major mistake by our parliament. I have said and will continue to say this, I will insist that the only correct path for us is to join the treaty. We cannot change the already adopted course toward nuclear-free status. You can build any illusions you like, even about creating our own nuclear

industry, but they are only illusions. It is clear to everyone that we do not need the weapons we inherited from the USSR. And nobody will ever use them.

Everybody knows that, even if such an insane idea was to come into somebody's head, it is practically impossible today for Ukraine to launch the missiles. Any of these 176 missiles can be launched only on orders from Moscow. This is clear to everyone, but nevertheless attempts continue to be made to turn us into a bogeyman.

In signing the trilateral statement and the annex to it in Moscow on 14 January, Ukraine won a political, economic, and human victory. The United States, Russia, and the entire world community shared it with us. Nobody will now say that Ukraine is standing still on the nuclear disarmament road. The road to START II and even START III is now open. Mankind has gained real hope of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

There is something else I also wish to stress. Most of the demands formulated in the Ukrainian Supreme Council's provisos relating to ratification of the START I treaty were met. In the documents which were signed the United States and Russia stated that they respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and independence, that is, they are becoming guarantors of our security. After acceding to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty—and I am confident that our parliament will now adopt such a decision—Ukraine will be safeguarded against nuclear attack. And, equally importantly, we will receive compensation for the uranium in the strategic missile warheads which will be sent to Russia, plus financial, scientific, and technical assistance in eliminating our nuclear weapons.

As for the part of your question relating to a tougher credit blockade, in December there was indeed a real threat of isolation. But now broad political and economic cooperation prospects are opening up for us.

**Prokopchuk:** And a final, purely personal point, Leonid Makarovich, if you will permit me. Since you also became head of government there has been an obvious increase in your workload. Do you manage to carve out time for your family and grandchildren? And in general what is your life like outside work?

**Kravchuk:** My grandson Andrey is 13 and as tall as me; he's an early developer. And my granddaughter Mashenka is six. She's so sweet and interesting. When they are with me it's the only time I get completely away from all the worries and problems. You have to answer their endless questions, you see. When we get involved in their games I myself also become like a child. I can play hide-and-seek with my eyes blindfolded; when they crawl around on their knees, I crawl around on my knees; when they jump, I jump. Those are the times I really relax....



### Send Letter to Parliament

LD2501182694 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
1806 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik]

[Text] Kiev January 25 TASS—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk called upon the parliament to revise its attitude towards the ratification of the US-Soviet Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) and the 1992 Lisbon Protocol.

An official letter by the president insisting that Ukraine should join the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty [NPT] was distributed among Ukrainian lawmakers on Tuesday.

Last November the Ukrainian parliament ratified the START-I imposing several tough conditions and stating that Ukraine should not join the NPT.

Ukraine's membership of the NPT was one of the key issues of the tripartite meeting of the Russian, American and Ukrainian presidents in Moscow.

The Ukrainian parliament is to consider the Moscow statement of the three presidents later this week.

### Text of Letter

LD2501204294 Kiev *UNIAK in Ukrainian* 1600 GMT  
25 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 25 Jan—A letter, dated 24 January 1994, from the president of Ukraine to Ukrainian deputies and Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, numbered 1-14/23 and concerning the Moscow statement, was distributed to people's deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. In particular the letter says:

"In connection with the recommendation by the Supreme Council of Ukraine contained in point 11 of the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 18 November 1993, I am informing the Supreme Council about the steps taken by myself and the government of Ukraine. Talks in a bi-lateral and tri-lateral format with the Russian Federation and the United States of America were initiated by us to implement the Supreme Council resolution. As a result of intense talks in Kiev, Washington and Moscow, a tri-lateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States and Russia was elaborated, which was signed in Moscow on 14 January of this year. The text of the statement and the appendix to it contain clauses going in the direction of implementing the issues noted in the resolution. In particular the accords reached in Moscow envisage granting Ukraine guarantees of its national security after the START-I Treaty comes into force and Ukraine accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They contain pledges regarding confirming independence, sovereignty, and existing borders and refraining from threats of force or using force or measures of economic pressure;

a pledge by the United States to grant Ukraine a minimum of 170 million dollars for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons with the possibility of the size of this assistance being increased; moving all nuclear warheads in Ukraine to Russia for their dismantlement with simultaneous compensation being granted in the form of deliveries of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for the needs of its nuclear power engineering.

In addition, and this is of especial political significance, it was confirmed that Ukraine, the United States and Russia will cooperate with each other as fully-fledged and equal partners and that relations between them should be developed on the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every state.

The United States also stated its readiness to render assistance to Ukraine in creating a market economy in Ukraine. In this way the tri-lateral statement and the appendix to it, and also their implementation, meet the demands set forth in the resolution of the Supreme Council of 18 November 1993. In connection with this, in accordance with an article of the constitution of Ukraine, by way of a legislative initiative I am submitting proposals to remove the reservations contained in the resolution of the Supreme Council of 18 November 1993 concerning article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol and Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A draft of a corresponding resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine is appended."

Appended to the document is the Supreme Council's draft resolution on this issue of the following contents:

"The Supreme Council's resolution on the implementation by the Ukrainian president and the Ukrainian government of recommendations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Ukrainian Supreme Council's resolution on the ratification of the Treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Nuclear Offensive Weapons, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the protocol to it, signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992;

Taking account of the specific steps that were taken by the Ukrainian president and government in the period from November 1993 to January 1994, in respect of the implementation of the provisions of the Supreme Council's resolution of 18 November 1993;

Proceeding from the results of the meeting between the Ukrainian, U.S. and Russian Federation presidents in Moscow on 14 January 1994 and the trilateral statement and appendix to it, signed by them;

Taking account of the fact that it was confirmed to Ukraine by the U.S. and Russian presidents that they were ready to extend to Ukraine national security guarantees after the START-I treaty is brought into effect and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty is acceded to by Ukraine as a nuclear-free state;



As well as taking account of the obligations by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain relating to Ukraine, to respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, refrain from the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence, as well as refraining from economic pressure, and [taking account of] their obligation not to use any weapons against Ukraine;

In view of the confirmation from the Ukrainian, American, and Russian presidents that they will build their relations on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of the states, as well as the confirmation of their readiness to assist Ukraine in setting up an effective market economy; and

Acknowledging the fact that the United States assured Ukraine of providing technical and financial assistance to dismantle nuclear weapons securely and safely and preserve fissionable material, as well as of promoting the speedy implementation of the agreements on this assistance, that are already in existence, the Supreme Council of Ukraine resolves:"

1. Taking into account the specific measures taken by the president and Government of Ukraine regarding implementation of the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 18 November 1993 and the steps on the part of the United States and Russia to meet Ukraine half way, to remove the reservations regarding Article 5 of the Protocol to the START-I Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

2. To charge the Government of Ukraine to exchange instruments of ratification of the START-I Treaty.

3. To accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968, which will henceforth be called the Treaty, as a state not owning nuclear weapons, with the following statement:

1) Ukraine owns the components of the nuclear weapons that it inherited from the former USSR. After the weapons are dismantled and destroyed under its control and in accordance with a procedure that will rule out the possibility of reusing these weapons' components for the original purpose, Ukraine intends to use the material extracted from them exclusively for civilian purposes, as fuel for Ukrainian AES [nuclear electric power station]'s in particular, or receive compensation for them;

2) The Treaty does not fully cover the unique situation that arose as a result of the disintegration of nuclear power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine until they are eliminated entirely, as well as appropriate activity to maintain, service, and eliminate them, does not contravene Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.

3) Ukraine will hold talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency with the aim of concluding agreements regarding the guarantees envisaged by the Treaty;

4) The violation of the territorial integrity or inviolability of Ukraine's borders on the part of any nuclear state will be viewed by Ukraine as a violation of the Treaty.

## Various Reactions to Tripartite Agreement

### Political Officials Comment on Nuclear Deal

LD1401162294 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1416 GMT  
14 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—Asked by a UNIAN correspondent today to comment on the documents signed by the Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. Presidents on removing nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia with the aim of dismantling them, Ihor Derkach, people's deputy of Ukraine and a member of the Supreme Council Committee for Defense and State Security Issues, stated: "This is yet another political step by Leonid Kravchuk who is unable to pursue any other policy. I cannot see any security guarantees from Russia and America. This simply is intended to deceive Ukraine with Kravchuk's help. As for the \$155 million allocated to Ukraine by Bill Clinton, this is the money that has been paid to American specialists who were on assignment in Ukraine."

Mykola Shulha, chairman of the Supreme Council Committee for Issues of State Sovereignty and Inter-Republican and Inter-ethnic Relations: "If after signing the documents Russia does not comply with the obligations assumed, this could undermine the global authority of such an influential state as America, and would have negative consequences for the whole world. As for the trilateral agreement, I shall endeavour to convince the Supreme Council to ratify this document. I believe that a compromise solution can also be found in settling the issues of the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol. Policy should be made through understanding and respect for the interests of our states."

Volodymyr Filenko, people's deputy of Ukraine and chairman of the Party of the Democratic Revival of Ukraine: "I expressed my opinion even before the documents were signed and can confirm that my assessment is positive. First, Ukraine today is economically unable to maintain this nuclear potential. Second, as a result of signing the agreement it will be provided with fuel for its nuclear electric stations, which will partly resolve the energy problem. Third, it will become possible to set up a certain stabilization fund to introduce the hryvnya [new national currency]. However, this is Ukraine's last reserve, and political and economic reforms are now badly needed."

Volodymyr Klymchuk, chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Ukraine: "I assess the signing of the Moscow agreement to be a Ukrainian diplomatic success, implementing the Declaration on the Independence of Ukraine. At last its primary provision on non-nuclear status is being realized and Ukraine will receive certain benefits which are badly needed. As for comments to the

effect that nuclear weapons will be handed to Zhirinovskiy, I would like to stress that this figure is no doubt dangerous. However, hidden national communists and national fascists are an even greater danger."

Mykhaylo Boychyshyn, chairman of the secretariat of the People's Movement of Ukraine: "What happened in Moscow is a total betrayal of the Ukrainian people, and is bad enough to stand trial for."

Mykola Bahrov, chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of the Crimea: "My assessment of the Moscow agreement between Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of Ukrainian nuclear weapons is positive. In general, President Leonid Kravchuk's assets are the international recognition of Ukraine. His liabilities are what has happened to the Ukrainian economy."

#### **Rukh Opposition Leader Calls Disarmament Treaty 'Treason'**

AU1401085394 Paris AFP in English 0840 GMT  
14 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, Jan 14 (AFP)—Leading Ukrainian lawmakers sharply criticized the treaty on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament signed in Moscow Friday, with several calling it "treason" and demanding that President Leonid Kravchuk step down.

"It is national treason," Vyacheslav Chornovyl, leader of the nationalist opposition movement Rukh, told AFP. "The United States and Russia have brought Ukraine to its knees."

The treaty, under which Ukraine pledged to get rid of all the nuclear weapons on its territory, was signed at the Kremlin by Kravchuk, US President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

#### **Further Statement From Opposition**

LD1401104694 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 0800 GMT  
14 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—Rukh-Press reported on 13 January that People's Movement of Ukraine [Rukh] Chairman Vyacheslav Chornovyl has described Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk's signing of the treaty on removing Ukraine's 176 nuclear missiles as a national betrayal. "This treaty will mean the full nuclear disarmament of Ukraine in as far as it embraces not only liquid fuel missiles, but also modern solid fuel missiles, which do not come under the 'START- I' Treaty, the Rukh chairman emphasized. [no closing quotation mark as received]

This is a shameful capitulation, for Ukraine will receive neither a single guarantee of its security, nor serious compensation. Two world superpowers—the United States and Russia—have combined their efforts in order to bring Ukraine to its knees. And this is easy for them to

do because, having plundered the state, the rotten Communist regime headed by Kravchuk is prepared for any kind of betrayal as long as an economic catastrophe is averted and they hold on to power at the expense of American and Russian handouts. Evidently Kravchuk expects the nomenclature to win in the March elections and the Supreme Council to ratify this shameful treaty. If we do not remove the traitors from power, Vyacheslav Chornovyl warned, then that is the end of Ukraine. They will not stop for anything—they will give up nuclear weapons, the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimea, and then even Ukraine itself. Then, I fear that Ukraine will for the second time this century lose a God-given chance to consolidate its statehood." [no opening quotation mark as received]

#### **Expert 'Optimistic' About NPT Ratification**

WS2101153494 Lvov MOLODA HALYCHYNA  
in Ukrainian 18 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with UN expert Professor Volodymyr Butkevych, by Oksana Hutsul; place and date not given: "The President Says It's an Advantage. Time Will Tell"]

[Text] Hutsul: What consequences will Ukraine face after the signing of the tripartite Moscow accord?

Butkevych: In my opinion, Ukraine's prestige in the world community will increase. Everybody understands that Ukraine is the first owner of nuclear arms that has decided to get rid of them serving as an example to others. It is evident that we will pursue the declared policy. What will other states gain? Ukraine's decision will reduce the number of nuclear states and strengthen world security.

However, I want to avoid pompous phrases like "historic stage in the development of international relations." I only want to say that this is the first step taken by a nuclear state toward implementing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. By the way, this is quite a complicated document. We have gained by joining the treaty, although many problems remain unresolved. Our joining the treaty will raise the issue of peaceful nuclear explosions currently used for building deep underground reservoirs for gas and oil. Experts cite at least 20 examples of when nuclear explosions are indispensable. There will be questions concerning the development and use of new nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes, nuclear fuel production, and, the most important—security assurances for Ukraine. There have been positive changes with regard to the latter. You probably remember that some time ago, we faced an ultimatum: There can be no security assurances prior to signing the treaty. Yet, it is clear that one cannot make another state eliminate its nuclear arms without granting this state's security. As of today, we are the first country to receive security assurances in the form of a treaty. However, our diplomacy and the legislature will have to resolve a number of issues. The Supreme Council will have to ratify certain international agreements which will probably put forth new questions. We have to understand

that compliance with our commitments will lead us to adopting a series of legal acts concerning the nonnuclear status, nuclear power engineering, and technologies. We need our legislature's goodwill and readiness to proceed in the same direction.

**Hutsul:** History is history, and international prestige, too, is a factor of importance. Still, what if our disarmament exposes us to "harsh treatment" from our northern neighbor?

**Butkevych:** Five or six years ago, a Swedish scientist conducted research and reached the conclusion that a nonnuclear state gains much more than it loses with regard to its national security.

**Hutsul:** However, there are trends in the world to acquire nuclear arms....

**Butkevych:** These are different processes, although I must admit that the NPT is not flawless. The treaty does not equally distribute the commitments of nuclear and nonnuclear states. The imperfect wording of articles leads to a situation when nonnuclear states have the same commitments as their nuclear counterparts. The treaty deals with proliferation of nuclear arms from the latter to the former and does not mention an opposite process. Nor does it resolve the issue of transporting nuclear arms via territories of nonnuclear countries, while Ukraine's geopolitical situation does not permit any other solution. The resolution of this issue is vitally important to us. In other words, a new stage of nuclear disarmament has begun, not experienced by any other country, and Ukraine is going to play a leading role in it.

**Hutsul:** Suppose the Supreme Council does not ratify the treaty. What will happen then?

**Butkevych:** If the parliament does not ratify the NPT in the form advocated by Ukraine and finally accepted by the world community, this will be viewed as a challenge. This undiplomatic stubbornness may cost our nation a high price. I believe that the legislature will ratify the treaty after a detailed analysis of all the clauses. Only if they find the treaty to contain some discriminating articles, will the legislature have the moral right to impose a ban on it. However, after analyzing all the circumstances I am still optimistic with regard to ratification.

#### **Scientists Welcome Decision on Nuclear Missiles for Fuel**

*LD1901110994 Kiev UKRINFORM in Ukrainian  
1743 GMT 18 Jan 94*

[Text] [No dateline as received]—Ukraine cannot resolve the problem of manufacturing fuel for atomic power stations from highly-enriched uranium contained in nuclear weapons on its own. It is also inexpedient to set up such production processes. This conclusion was reached by the bureau of the Commission for Issues of Nuclear Policy under the president of Ukraine, which

examined this issue at a meeting chaired by Academician Viktor Baryhtar [name as received] of Ukraine's Academy of Sciences.

In the opinion of the meeting's participants Ukraine does not have any possibility for extracting highly-enriched uranium and processing it and this is why they support the decision to transfer nuclear warheads to Russia in return for fuel for nuclear power stations. According to experts' calculations, the construction of new production processes for reprocessing highly-enriched uranium from nuclear warheads will not strategically solve the problem because there is not enough of it. Moreover, in general these production processes are ecologically dangerous.

The commission's bureau has resolved to support the activity of the president in up drawing appropriate agreements with Russia and the United States that would suit the national interests of the state. [signed] The press service of the president and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

#### **Defense Official Gives Positive Interview**

*LD1801200394 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 1700 GMT 18 Jan 94*

[Quotation marks denote recorded passages]

[Text] The trilateral statement by the Ukrainian, U.S., and Russian presidents on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of our state remains at the center of attention. So today we continue the topic of a nuclear-free Ukraine.

Talking with our correspondent Vitaliy Lytvynov, Colonel General Ivan Oliynyk, deputy defense minister for arms issues, speaks on the military, scientific, and technological aspects of the implementation of the trilateral statement and an appendix to it on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine:

**Oliynyk, in Russian with superimposed Ukrainian translation:** "The atmosphere at the meeting between the three presidents on 14 January 1994 was exceptionally friendly and benevolent. It was one of respect. The timing of the meeting was no accident. It had been predetermined by a number of factors which need airing and explaining today. Factor 1 is the technical condition of the nuclear warheads in Ukraine today. Factor 2 is our difficult economic situation. And, finally, Factor 3 is that both the president and government had to implement the decisions taken by the Ukrainian Supreme Council."

**Lytvynov:** The world has reacted to this in a very positive manner. The interpretation of this issue here in Ukraine, however, is not uniform, in particular because the people are concerned about us actually becoming defenseless should we rid ourselves of our nuclear forces. This is how our collocutor answered this question:



Oliynyk: "The condition of the arms and the purpose of their use in Ukraine (?did not have any bearing) on the issues of our security. We do not control these weapons, we cannot maintain them in the technically perfect condition and we cannot but implement the decision taken by our state to become non-nuclear in future."

"With regard to our security, it can be viewed from two standpoints. That is, relying on our own forces and creating non-nuclear weapons that can enable us to ensure the protection of our state; after all, we are a great rocket and space power. It should also be said that we hope the pledges that were given by the United States, the Russian Federation, and Great Britain will be carried into effect both in respect of our state and the international community."

**Correspondent:** Answering the question on how long, what is the duration of the process of nuclear disarmament the Ukrainian deputy defense minister said:

Oliynyk: "This is a lengthy process which is to be determined by the technical condition and the possibility to safely move these weapons over a long distance by transporting them. Everybody today wants to hear when the first and the last weapon will be removed. The state must have its own state secrets, for these are very dangerous and unusual weapons. That is why to advertise today when a train will cross Ukraine by railway over a distance of over 700 km to our western borders is unnecessary and risky. We must keep this transport a secret, to ensure safe transportation."

#### **Radetsky Says Agreement 'Timely'**

LD1901194894 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1757 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitaly Radetsky has assessed the trilateral agreement on nuclear disarmament signed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk in Moscow on January 14 as "timely." "Ukraine has been and will be a great missile and space power regardless of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from our territory," he told a meeting with the heads of the mass media in Kiev. "We have everything necessary to build missiles and fly into space," he added.

Speaking on his attitude to the presidential elections in Crimea, Radetsky pointed out that as defense minister he regarded this event "normally." "But as a citizen of Ukraine, I am confident that there must be only one president in the republic," he said.

The minister also said an inspection of the Black Sea Fleet will be carried out in the near future. He said it was "costly" for both Russia and Ukraine to maintain the Black Sea Fleet.

Summing up the results of the first two years since the creation of the Ukrainian army, Radetsky said that during this time Ukraine concluded bilateral agreements on military cooperation with 19 states. During Kazakh

President Nursultan Nazarbayev's visit to Kiev scheduled for January 20-21, such an agreement is expected to be signed with Kazakhstan, too.

According to Radetsky, by now the Ukrainian army has been reduced by over 200,000 troops compared to last year. By the end of 1995, the republican armed forces will have 450,000 personnel.

#### **Benefits Questioned**

WS2501145694 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA  
in Ukrainian 21 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Olena Lisnych: "What Will Ukraine Get From the Nuclear Deal?"]

[Text] At first, it should be emphasized that terms and figures included in the agreement by the three presidents and in an appendix to it are suspended in a volatile imbalance, because that document does not have the force of a concrete international legal document, reflecting simply formal political obligations assumed by all sides. If that document had the form of an agreement or treaty, it would certainly affect our internal law, which would enable the parliament to resort to its favorite weapon, impeachment.

"I have no doubts whatsoever about the legitimacy of what was done by the executive branch. However, it is up to the Supreme Council to examine how this was done," said Mr. Chalyy, chief of the legal department at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Thus, the Ukrainian parliament will have to ratify START I with no reservations and join the nonproliferation treaty to implement the agreement. Ideally, the legislature should endorse START 2, that is, to give the go-ahead regarding the destruction of nuclear arsenals so that the Moscow agreement is legally binding. Silenced by top officials of our state, this question somehow remains nothing more than rhetoric.

It is strange that the agreement's appendix provides for the decommissioning of most of the modern SS-24 missiles within 10 months and not the SS-19's whose short expiration terms cause much concern.

The agreement signed in Moscow will surely be extended by a long chain of negotiations, and its contours—now pretty vague—will have to become more specific.

#### **Nuclear Fuel**

"Enriched uranium contained in nuclear arms is a matter of a purely commercial nature," said Bill Clinton at a press conference at the Boryspil Airport. It was agreed that within seven years, Russia would process—at our expense—highly enriched uranium into fuel for atomic power stations, one portion of which will be immediately shipped to Ukraine (100 tonnes of low-activated uranium in the first 10 months), while another part will be sold to the United States for \$1 billion. Ideally, Washington should send this billion to Kiev. However, Russia also claims its portion of the nuclear



pie as a country tasked with processing the uranium. So far, details regarding the division of this billion-dollar tidbit are inaccessible.

#### Debts for Energy Sources

The information that came in last Friday [14 January] about Moscow's pledges of fair play in negotiating the \$2-billion indebtedness with Kiev have not borne out entirely. Looming ahead is the perspective of endless blanket-pulling and difficult inter-governmental talks. According to a dark vision by government officials, instead of the entire debt, Russia will agree to forgive only its small portion. The point is that structures with looser dependence from the state, such as the "Gazprom," were also engaged in energy supplies. This kind of "debt canceling" is more profitable for them.

#### Support of International Financial Organizations

This support is possible only when Ukraine devises clear-cut plans for getting out of an economic crisis. In other words, only staunch optimists can count on it at the present time. For example, propped up by the United States, Russia is expecting \$1.5 billion from the International Monetary Fund and \$500 billion from the World Bank. This is a modest sum considering the size of Russia, and would remain so if allocated to Ukraine. Hypothetically, even with credits on hand, Ukraine should be prepared for high interest rates.

#### Tactical Weapons

This appears to be the biggest "white spot" in all this nuclear business. The agreement does not offer a clear statement on compensation for tactical weapons removed from the three ex-Soviet republics to Russia. Officials warily say that "experts are now working on this issue."

#### Support for Weapons Destruction Process

This support was offered by the Nunn-Lugar plan initiated in December 1991 and will be financed by U.S. Defense Department resources. The plan's basic provisions envisioned for 1993 fiscal year spendings for dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons, establishing aid funds for disarming CIS countries, and humanitarian aid, which is \$800 million, \$100 million, and \$410 million, respectively, for all nuclear successors of the Soviet Union. Of this amount, \$175 million for technical assistance in weapons destruction was promised to Leonid Kravchuk by then-President Bush in December 1992. This promise was also confirmed by Bill Clinton at the meeting with the Ukrainian president in Kiev. The American side is relying on its experience of scraping similar 300-missile complexes in 1992 that needed \$300 billion for destruction. Foreign Ministry officials claim that if the process "gets rolling," Americans are ready to provide additional funds to Ukraine. On the other hand, the Nunn-Lugar program contains quite a few discriminative limitations. One of them, for instance, says that the CIS country receiving this aid

should also put in its own money to finance the destruction of nuclear weapons. So disarmament will definitely put a squeeze on the more than meager Ukrainian budget. In addition, Ukraine will be able to use the \$175 billion only for U.S. and Ukrainian (practically nonexistent) technologies and experts.

The United States will definitely reap most of the profits coming from the nuclear deal. Bill Clinton returned to the White House with another victory. The United States will cash in on buying cheap fuel for atomic power stations practically without spending their budget dollars for the important cause of "peace in all the world." Ex-Soviet republics safeguard the quiet sleep of Americans because the spread of nuclear technologies and weapons to unreliable Asian regimes—so much feared by America shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union—appears to be unrealistic now. Russia, America's strategic partner, achieved its goals by bashing Ukraine on the nuclear issue. The issue of energy debts—one of the leverages over Ukraine—remains unsolved; now even fuel supplies to Ukrainian atomic power plants depend on Russia.

So what has Ukraine gotten from the deal except for international acknowledgment? For now, we can definitely point to a great relief for our state budget from a huge burden imposed by servicing nuclear complexes. In addition, preliminary estimates show that the 100 tonnes of fuel for atomic stations, due within 10 months, will keep our plants going for two years.

#### Interview With Tarasenko

LD2301121694 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service  
in Ukrainian 0920 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] The trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons on the territory of our state remains the focus of attention. If, in the world as a whole this move is supported on a mass scale, in Ukraine attitudes toward this statement and its assessments are ambiguous. Our correspondent Petro Ostapenko met Oleksandr Tarasenko, the deputy chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine's Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security, and asked him to express his attitude toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia.

[Begin recording] **Ostapenko:** Ukraine's President Leonid Kravchuk and representatives of the executive bodies of power are saying today that the trilateral statement is the result and continuation, let us say, of the decisions by the Supreme Council on nuclear weapons. Oleksandr, what is your opinion? Is this true?

**Tarasenko:** Well, this document still needs in-depth comprehension. First, it is called a statement, a trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia. How should we assess it today? Does it have a legal force as an international document and as an agreement, or is this just a statement? Upon studying

it profoundly—yesterday our commission was considering this document—upon studying it profoundly, it can, in the long run, be qualified as an international agreement. In compliance with our current legislation—the Constitution first and foremost—and in compliance with the law on the president, on his plenary powers, the international agreements that Ukraine—that is, the executive power, concludes in the field of defense, military construction, military relations with neighboring and other states, are subject to mandatory ratification by the Supreme Council.

Why did I say that this document is an agreement and not a statement? Because, there is a supplement to the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia as of 14 January, and this supplement provides specific dates, the terms in which our strategic nuclear weapons should be fully deactivated, their number, and so on. This goes beyond the limits of the resolution that was adopted by the Supreme Council. What does this supplement stipulate? This supplement gives, for example, such parameters: Ukraine ensures the elimination of all nuclear weapons, including strategic offensive weapons—that is, strategic air force, TU-160 and other aircraft carrying nuclear missiles, located on its territory, in compliance with its relevant agreements within the term of seven years as is envisaged by the START I Treaty and within the context of the statement by the Supreme Council of Ukraine on Ukraine's non-nuclear status, all the RS-22 missiles—to be more specific they are called SS-24—on Ukraine's territory will be deactivated within 10 months by means of removing their warheads. What does it mean?

You know that in two thirds of our silos launcher vehicles are filled with liquid fuel—that is, heptyl. The entire world already knows what kind of a liquid fuel this is. This heptyl is a super poisonous substance, and the launcher vehicle itself is even a bigger powder keg than the launcher vehicle and the warhead as a whole. Proceeding from this, Ukraine and its plenary bodies and persons must take into account their own interests, first and foremost, and not the interests of those who benefit from this unilaterally. I believe that the Supreme Council, either the present or the future one, should seriously ponder over this document, and it can be ratified only after its parameters are specified.

**Ostapenko:** I am sorry to interrupt you. You have just read out the item that has to do with all sides without exception. But nothing is said here about the Supreme Council resolution on the ratification of START I with reservations. It clearly stipulates that 36 percent of launcher vehicles and 42 percent of warheads are subject to elimination today. That is to say, these parameters have been extended to all nuclear [word indistinct].

**Tarasenko:** Absolutely. They run contrary to the Supreme Council resolution. The Supreme Council resolution and START I envisage percentage and here is says about the complete elimination.

In this connection I would like to say the following, so that our radio listeners and our compatriots, our half-brothers, as they say, would know it: All those strategic nuclear systems located on the territory of Ukraine are targeted at certain objectives in the United States of America and relevant bases beyond the borders of the U.S. Correspondingly, approximately the same number of nuclear weapons are targeted at our territory. Well, this is military strategy and tactics and there is nothing incomprehensible here. Everybody understands this: If you target me, then I target you. But this document should also envisage adequate moves on the part of the United States of America, and our control over this, because everyone will control us, control how we eliminate nuclear weapons, remove nuclear warheads, transfer them from Ukraine to Russia. The only thing envisaged here is that Ukraine will have the possibility to control Russia neutralizing the nuclear warheads. However, this agreement does not envisage what the United States will do with that quantity of strategic nuclear weapons that are targeted at us, and what will be Ukraine's role in carrying out control over this process, as far as the actions of the United States are concerned.

Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin declared that they would decode their missiles, which would then be retargeted at some deserted islands, or something like that. Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged, is that right?

**Tarasenko:** Ukraine's participation here is not envisaged. Moreover, I disagree with such a stand, just as a citizen and just as an inhabitant of this planet Earth. If Ukraine eliminates these weapons, the former weapons of the Soviet Union, as is known, then the United States of America should eliminate and neutralize the same quantity of weapons. This is what we are talking about, not about retargeting at some other states, and so on. That is to say, there is no alternative in the world to universal nuclear disarmament and appropriate actions by all nuclear states. This is what our politicians should insist on, and at this point I again repeat and emphasize that the given document needs in-depth comprehension in legal terms, in terms of international law. What obligations, what guarantees can we talk about? Because, they already guaranteed us something to a certain extent. Let us not mention any names today, because there has already been enough talk about this. Who is to blame and who, let us say, ordered the transfer of tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine? Those are our weapons. They would have been of paramount importance for the defense capacity of Ukraine. However, we transferred those weapons and could not cope with these ones. Here we outwitted ourselves.

**Ostapenko:** I know, Oleksandr, that you are familiar with the technical condition of the strategic nuclear weapons, missiles, and warheads located on Ukraine's territory. Today, in numerous interviews, the military say that it is difficult for Ukraine to service them, that Ukraine will be unable to service them, therefore, the sooner we deactivate and transfer these weapons, the better for Ukraine. What do you think about it, please.

**Tarasenko:** You, Petro, probably touched upon a very important aspect of this problem. It is quite clear that nuclear warheads and their systems are the most sophisticated systems because they should be sophisticated as they guarantee the safety of a nuclear warhead itself and a silo as a whole. This is why there exists a practice in the world according to which the given warheads are serviced by the authors who manufactured them. The authors themselves can destroy them. There is no other process, as they say. In this respect, we could find a state that would do this [word indistinct] but we cannot do this without Russia because the one who will have access there should know what it is, and so on. Therefore, every launching system and, moreover, nuclear warhead has relevant terms which guarantee their safety, and systems. We cannot do this without Russia. Therefore, it is necessary either to have very specific, responsible bilateral agreements toward that end with Russia on ensuring periodic servicing of the warheads and the silos as a whole or to neutralize and transfer them after their guaranteed service life expires. There is no other way around. Also, it could be possible to do as follows: A certain number of warheads and silos could be dismantled without their periodic servicing after their guaranteed service life expires. This is the way to follow. This would be the most correct, most appropriate way. Following it, one should move from the warhead, from the head, as they say, to the tail. That is to say, to dismantle the entire silo and not just remove the warheads and leave the rest with ourselves. It would be the same kind of a powder keg. Therefore, the most correct way is to act in line with a stage-by-stage, unit-by-unit principle. Both the warhead and the launcher vehicle should be dismantled completely. This would ensure the highest level of security to our state.

**Ostapenko:** One more, very important aspect, as far as this problem is concerned. Did you see the guarantees of Ukraine's national security in this statement and in the supplement, the guarantees that Ukraine and the Supreme Council were striving for and which all those living in Ukraine wish to have.

**Tarasenko:** Undoubtedly, there are certain aspects and elements of security here. There are such provisions, and so on. But, as they say, history and mankind know instances when such guarantees were given, when there were agreements, but there was the Second World War despite these bilateral and multilateral agreements, and 22 million people died and the economies in a whole number of countries were destroyed. This is why one should rely on God but have his own mind, as they say. Both our military and scientific potentials should work toward ensuring our state security—not at the expense of nuclear weapons now but at the expense of other highly effective means. Such measures are being taken today. This is why, simultaneously with the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, fulfilling that resolution by the Supreme Council, we should work concurrently toward ensuring the combat readiness of our Armed Forces. Our commission, together with military departments, is carrying out this work. [end recording]

[Announcer] Such is the attitude of people's deputy, deputy chairman of the Supreme Council Commission for Issues of Defense and State Security Oleksandr Tarasenko toward the trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

#### Envoy to Russia Praises Agreement

LD2401074694 Moscow *ITAR-TASS in English*  
0734 GMT 24 Jan 94

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Yefim Shvartsman]

[Text] Kiev January 24 TASS—Vladimir Kryzhanovskiy, Ukrainian ambassador to Russia, has described the tripartite Moscow agreement on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament as a great breakthrough not only for Ukrainian, but also for Russian diplomacy. He took part in the Perekrystok programme, broadcast by Ukrainian TV on Sunday, which highlighted the forthcoming discussion of the agreement by the Ukrainian parliament, due to take place on January 25.

The Ukrainian ambassador stressed that Russia had approached the tripartite Moscow agreement realistically, acting as an equal and not senior partner during the settlement of the complicated problem. Kryzhanovskiy said that he supported the tripartite Moscow agreement on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament both as a diplomat and a Ukrainian citizen. "Nuclear weapons are not what our people need today. The problem for them is survival. If nuclear disarmament even involves compensation, the Ukrainian parliament should support the Moscow agreement," he said.

The same idea was expressed by Ukrainian Deputy Defence Minister Colonel General Ivan Bizhan, who also took part in the Perekrystok programme. He stressed that President Kravchuk had acted in Moscow on the basis of the resolution of the Ukrainian parliament in the part, dealing with the ratification of the START-I Treaty. He pointed out that the participation of the United States in the Moscow treaty is a positive factor and a guarantee, and called attention to the importance for Ukraine of the fact that Russia agreed to provide maintenance to the nuclear warheads, deployed in Ukraine.

#### Kostenko Speaks Out

LD2401203394 Moscow *INTERFAX in English*  
1909 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will consider the parliamentary commissions' resolution on the joint statement signed by the Ukrainian, Russian and U.S. presidents in Moscow on January 25.

The Supreme Soviet's presidium discussed this issue in Kiev on Monday.

Leader of the Ukrainian parliament's working group on preparations for ratification of the START-I treaty,



Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko, said on Monday that he saw neither economic and military "interests of Ukraine" nor guarantees for security in the statement.

He believes that "due to this the Moscow statement should be considered properly and receive a juridical evaluation."

Kostenko explained the fact that the document was signed in a form of a statement requiring no ratification by the parliament as "juridical intriguing" and demanded that deputies determine "whether the Moscow statement was useful for Ukraine."

He added that the Moscow trilateral statement proposed "in fact a new scheme for Ukraine's nuclear disarmament, which differs from the one worked out by the parliament."

"We are moving towards a non-nuclear status. However, we do this in conformity with the interests of Ukraine. The events in Moscow represent not only a military but also an economic and political split within the country rather than nuclear disarmament," the minister believes.

He also stated that Ukraine had already withdrawn to Russia tactical nuclear weapons together with approximately 10 tons of high enriched plutonium and 90 tons of high enriched uranium. In his words, 1 kilogram of plutonium will cost about \$1 Mn and 1 kilogram of uranium up to \$100,000 on the world market.

"This means that today Russia is Ukraine's debtor and not vice versa. Russia must compensate Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons with account taken of the equivalent exchange of the cost of uranium for oil and gas."

#### Kostenko Interviewed

MK2601104094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA  
in Russian 26 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Yuriy Kostenko, Ukrainian environment minister and head of a parliamentary working group on START I and nuclear disarmament, by Vladimir Skachko: "This Is Not Disarmament but Disrobing (razdevaniye, also meaning 'robbing') of the State. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Can Give a Legal Assessment of the Moscow Statement by the Three Presidents"—first paragraph is introduction; place, date not given]

[Text] Ivan Plyushch, speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, has stated that the Supreme Soviet must decide on the question of compatibility of Ukraine's national interests with the statement signed by presidents of the United States, Ukraine, and Russia on the future of the Ukrainian strategic missiles and also consider a draft resolution on Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. According to Ivan Plyushch, because the resolution on joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was prepared by the presidential services, the report on this matter should be made by

President Leonid Kravchuk. Yuriy Kostenko, head of a special working deputies group on preparing the START I Treaty and on Ukraine's acquiring a nonnuclear status, and minister for environmental protection, commented for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the deputies' decision to return to these matters.

**Kostenko:** The Moscow tripartite statement has actually offered quite a different scheme of nuclear disarmament for Ukraine than what was decided on this score by our Supreme Soviet. This scheme does not take many aspects into account either from the viewpoint of national security or from the viewpoint of our economic interests. Therefore the Moscow statement must be considered in full as a separate agreement and be given an appropriate legal assessment.

**Skachko:** But this is a statement, not an agreement. The parliament may neither ratify it, nor fail to ratify it.

**Kostenko:** I understand this. The statement has been made in such a way that it could not be submitted to the consideration of the Supreme Soviet. This is so-called legal chicanery. Now, Ukraine's supreme legislative body adopts one scheme of nuclear disarmament while the executive branch, contrary to this, proposes a totally different one. Therefore the Supreme Soviet, in line with the current constitution and entitled to consider all international agreements, is also to consider this document as well as give it a proper legal appraisal and establish whether it is good for Ukraine. Possibly, it will have to be vetoed as a document which contradicts Ukraine's national interests.

**Skachko:** And presumably the parliament resolution on this question must be enforced?

**Kostenko:** This is undoubtedly the power of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, I would like to point out that the work conducted by the Supreme Soviet will allow, in my opinion, more or less to balance Ukraine's interests with the interests of those who insist that Ukraine become nuclear-free. In the Moscow document I do not see either the economic interests or guarantees of Ukraine's security that many are talking about so much.

**Skachko:** How would you comment on the view that neither the statement nor the appendix to it contains a word on compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons evacuated to Russia?

**Kostenko:** This only shows once again that there is a certain contradiction between what our Supreme Soviet has adopted and what our president has signed. The parliament resolution clearly says that compensation must be made also for the tactical nuclear weapons, while the Moscow statement does not say anything about this separately. As far as I know, Russia apparently promises to consider this issue and provide some compensation after all.

**Skachko:** In other words, compensation for tactical nuclear weapons is a subject of separate talks between Ukraine and Russia?



**Kostenko:** Yes, talks on this issue have been going on, but it has not been settled conclusively yet because experts have been tasked to consider it and establish how exactly compensation will be made.

**Skachko:** Has any time frame been defined for making compensation to Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons?

**Kostenko:** No, no term has been established. This is very difficult to do because no one knows with what funds compensation will be made. If from the proceeds of the 500 tonnes of enriched uranium that Russia is to sell to the United States, then this can happen only after this uranium has been sold on the world market. Only then will Russia start partially to receive real money and, naturally, will be able to make some compensation to Ukraine. At present, however, no such funds are available. True, there is also another option (which, incidentally, would be the most adequate for Ukraine): to evaluate the cost of each warhead. This is possible because it is known how much uranium and plutonium there is in each warhead. Therefore, using an equivalent, one could estimate the value of the tactical nuclear weapons that we have transferred to Russia. According to our preliminary estimates, the value is \$10 billion. Assuming this sum, Russia is already in debt to Ukraine—not the other way around, as some are trying to have us believe today. And if we talk about energy, then, given that uranium and plutonium are very valuable energy carriers, an equivalent exchange scheme could be used: We deliver highly enriched uranium and plutonium to them, and they supply us with oil and gas. But unfortunately this option has not been used; moreover, during the talks the subject of "plutonium" was somehow lost altogether. And it is a very costly element: one kilogram of enriched plutonium, according to various estimates, can cost up to \$1 million, and one kilogram of enriched uranium up to \$100,000. Now you can imagine the value of the material assets that we have already transferred to Russia.

**Skachko:** How much uranium and plutonium have you transferred to Russia?

**Kostenko:** Approximately 10 tonnes of enriched plutonium and more than 90 tonnes of enriched uranium.

**Skachko:** What is the correlation in parliament of people who advocate a solution of the problem of Ukraine's nuclear weapons on terms favorable for it and those who are ready to give the missiles away?

**Kostenko:** Judging by the results of voting during the ratification of START I, it can be said that the majority of parliament members are inclined toward organizing a normal nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. But what has happened in Moscow is not nuclear disarmament but the disrobing of the state. In the military, economic, and political sense.

### **Parliament's Presidium Passes No Resolution on Agreement**

*LD2501114994 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1111 GMT 25 Jan 94*

[Text] The Ukrainian parliament's presidium did not pass any resolutions on the Ukrainian, Russian, and U.S. presidents' Moscow statement on nuclear disarmament.

What the three presidents discussed and documented in Moscow is not an agreement, Chairman of the parliamentary Commission for International Affairs Dmitri Pavlychko told journalists. "Therefore, for the moment we can only state our attitude to this document," he said.

Pavlychko believes that the Moscow statement cannot replace the Ukrainian parliament's resolution. Such a resolution can only be replaced by an agreement, not by a protocol of intent, he said. "We can only ratify an agreement," he added.

Pavlychko also believes that the final decision on the problem will be made by a new parliament. He said that Leonid Kravchuk shared this belief.

### **National Assembly Accuses Kravchuk of 'High Treason'**

*AU2601141094 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA  
in Ukrainian 25 Jan 94 p 1*

[Commentary by Ihor Nedyukha, candidate of technological sciences: "Once Again About the 'Shield' and 'Sword'"]

[Text] According to the press, the Ukrainian Nationalist Assembly [UNA] has sent the chairman of Ukraine's Security Service, Ye. Marchuk, a statement (the text was supplied), containing a request to evaluate President L. Kravchuk's activity during the negotiations with the presidents of the United States and Russia on Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. This statement, in fact, accuses the Ukrainian president of violations of the law to the extent of high treason.

However, the impression arises that the UNA leadership had not read Marchuk in HOLOS UKRAYINY 12 December 1992 where he insisted on the expediency of Ukraine's staying under the "nuclear shield of Russia," in other words, on the current policy of the total nuclear disarmament of Ukraine.

For that reason, I find it inappropriate to demand that Marchuk does the evaluation. This conclusion does not only apply to the UNA appeal, but also to the analogous statement by the Ukrainian Conservative Republican Party [UKRP].

The validity of the above interpretation is confirmed, at least, by the fact that the transfer to Russia of the "Sword"—the tactical nuclear weapons—is known to have been completed on the night of 5 and 6 May 1992.

It remains to be hoped that opponents of the Ukrainian president in the ranks of the UNA and UKRP will also agree that the same people must be among those who have planned and those who are implementing the measures for withdrawing the entire "Sword" and "Shield" (strategic nuclear weapons) complex from Ukraine.

#### Further Deliberations Planned

LD2601182594 Moscow INTERFAX in English  
1704 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] The Moscow declaration on denuclearizing Ukraine signed by the presidents of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States does not meet the republic's interests in full, deputy head of the international affairs commission Bogdan Goryn told INTERFAX-Ukraine.

In his words, the Supreme Soviet is now discussing the points that are out of line with the country's national interests.

In the meantime, Goryn says it is up to a new parliament, to be elected on March 27, to consider the ratification of the Moscow declaration because of inability by the Supreme Soviet to take a measured resolution on the issue. He said the parliament would adopt a resolution, but with some strings attached.

Last November, the parliament ratified the Start-I agreement and the Lisbon protocol, but conditioned that to economic aid and security guarantees to Ukraine. The Lisbon protocol was ratified without its article 5 which provided for Kiev's adherence to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty as a nuclear free state.

President Kravchuk on Tuesday called on parliament to approve the protocol in full, arguing that the tripartite Moscow agreement met all of the parliament's stipulations for ratifying the paper.

However, Goryn said the President's statement "goes beyond the framework of the parliamentary resolution."

#### Kostenko Publishes Vehement Article

AU2401123394 Kiev UKRAYINSKA HAZETA  
in Ukrainian No 2 (44) 20 Jan- 2 Feb 94 p 1

[Article by Yuriy Kostenko, Ukraine's minister of environmental protection, head of the deputies' working group for issues of nuclear disarmament: "We Have Given Away \$10 Billion to Russia; This Time, It Will Be Even More"—first paragraph published in boldface; passage between slantlines also published in boldface]

[Text] On 12 January, U.S. president Bill Clinton's aircraft touched down at Boryspil Airport. According to numerous preliminary statements by presidential aides and advisers, as well as by the U.S. press, the visit had not been planned. The press hailed Bill Clinton's intention to visit Minsk and Moscow and asserted that he was not going to visit Kiev because Ukraine was not

behaving properly on the nuclear issue. They said that Ukraine would later be summoned to Moscow for negotiations. However, the boss of the White House changed his decision—Kiev's airport was the first of those of the former Soviet republics to receive him. The president took a step backward, but now he wants to take two, three, or four steps forward.

Against the background of the victory of Zhirinovskiy's party in Russia, the sensational reports on the total elimination of nuclear weapons in Ukraine do not only give rise to a series of questions, but also to the feeling of anxiety and uncertainty among the citizens of our, and not only our, state.

One cannot fail to see the perfectly obvious contradictions between the decisions adopted by the Supreme Council on the reduction of nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian land and some statements in the agreement about to be signed by the presidents of the three states. For example, in accordance with the Supreme Council decree on the ratification of START-I, Ukraine takes upon itself an obligation to destroy 42 percent of its nuclear warheads over seven years. Before he arrived in Kiev, Clinton declared in Brussels that all the warheads would be removed from our territory in the coming two or three years. Therefore, if such an agreement is signed, a quite logical question arises: "Why should Ukraine fulfill all those extremely unprofitable procedures for destroying strategic offensive weapons as envisaged by START-I? It is known that its theses were elaborated more than 10 years ago, when the USSR, which manufactured nuclear weapons, was still in existence."

The absence at that time of the effective mechanisms for control over the manufacture of nuclear warheads led to the elaboration of such operations for destroying strategic nuclear forces, which could be clearly pinpointed and controlled. It is precisely for that reason that, in accordance with the agreement, the account for destroyed strategic weapons is made in terms of dismantled launch vehicles and destroyed launch silos and not in terms of destroyed nuclear warheads.

Incidentally, with regard to the latter, the practice of dismantling a training launch silo in Pervomaysk showed that the real economic and ecological losses exceeded the worst predictions. All those who saw the photographic illustration of this barbaric action in IZVESTIYA of 11 January 1994 could judge for themselves.

Well, in view of the fact that Ukraine does not manufacture its own nuclear warheads, the removal of nuclear warheads from our territory also automatically signifies the elimination of the strategic offensive weapons. Even if entire strategic missiles remained in complete launch silos, with such a missile we would, perhaps, be able to launch, instead of a nuclear warhead, nothing more than nuclear waste from the Chernobyl sarcophagus.

However, here a clear position is necessary—either we pursue a stage-by-stage reduction of our nuclear arsenals

in accordance with previous terms, or destroy nuclear warheads alone without ruining those things that may still serve our state, namely the launch vehicles and the launch silos. Yet another important issue with regard to new initiatives is the problem of compensation for nuclear disarmament. The sum of material assistance promised by Mr. Clinton cannot be compared to the losses that Ukraine has sustained. I will analyze just one aspect of this problem. The highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium are the most valuable materials of the nuclear warhead. It is impossible to determine the market price of these materials, because their sale is forbidden by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. At the same time, in accordance with some estimates, the known expenditure on the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium are, respectively, up to \$100,000 and up to \$1 million per kilogram. Together with the tactical weapons, Ukraine has already handed over to Russia more than 50 tonnes of weapons-grade plutonium, which, according to the minimum estimate, is worth over \$10 billion. This indebtedness of Russia to Ukraine would be enough to compensate for the deliveries of energy resources to us for more than a year./

As regards the new agreement, the proposals that the highly enriched uranium from the strategic missile warheads be processed at Russian enterprises and that Ukraine be repaid with low-grade uranium in the form of fuel for nuclear power stations are economically unprofitable for Ukraine. The low-grade uranium is worth about a hundredth of the highly-enriched uranium. On the other hand, in accordance with the concept of the development of nuclear power engineering in Ukraine, it would be economically expedient to manufacture our own fuel cartridges for the nuclear power stations. It would, therefore, be best to process highly enriched uranium in Ukraine. This is corroborated by the proposals from the well-known U.S. General Atomic Company, which proposed that a joint enterprise on manufacturing fuel for nuclear power stations be organized in Ukraine.

The cost of such an enterprise would be just \$30 million. Besides, after completing the program for processing the highly-enriched uranium into low-grade uranium, this enterprise might be used within the technological cycle of our own capacities for manufacturing fuel for nuclear power stations. Unfortunately, the leadership of our state ignored these proposals. It is necessary to return to this issue.

One more commentary on the new initiatives. The fact that Ukraine is presently in a certain degree of international isolation is not due to nuclear weapons, as some people are trying to prove, but to the absence of any reforms. That is why, had there been conditions in Ukraine favorable for efficient entrepreneur activity and not stagnation with corruption and bribery, there would not have been such a thing as the so-called "Ukrainian syndrome," which allegedly scares away investors.

Speaking about the nuclear weapons of the former USSR, Western entrepreneurs and politicians are not so much concerned about the availability of nuclear weapons, as about the possible coming to power in Russia of Mr. Zhirinovskiy.

#### Presidential Adviser Gives Interview to L'ECHO

BR1901164594 Brussels L'ECHO in French 19 Jan 94  
p 4

[Interview with Anton Buteyko, Ukrainian presidential adviser, by Francoise Delstanche in Brussels on 18 January: "Kiev Expresses Its Faith in the Face of the Agreement on Denuclearization"; first four paragraphs are L'ECHO introduction]

[Text] Anton Buteyko believes that the West is focusing too much attention on nuclear affairs. Moderately optimistic about the nuclear agreement for the future since, according to him, the president has met Parliament's demands, Kravtchuk's adviser sees no progress being made on the dossier regarding the Black Sea fleet.

The tripartite agreement between the United States, Russia, and Ukraine, signed last Friday in Moscow, was saluted yesterday by the European Union as "an important contribution to international security and stability," albeit on condition that it be implemented rapidly, failing which any delay would be considered with great anxiety.

The practical implementation of the agreement effectively depends on the backing of the Ukrainian Parliament in Kiev. Not directly, but with respect to the conditions that it imposed on the ratification of the Start I agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, and on the ratification of the treaty on nuclear non-proliferation, both of which Washington had laid down as preconditions. However, the Ukrainian leaders are proving relatively confident on these points. That is what was explained to us yesterday by Anton Buteyko in an interview given while passing through Brussels. However, he believes that the West is focussing too much attention on the nuclear problem and forgetting that other elements are emerging as definitely just as important. Consequently, he argues, the development of equal relations with the European Union would contribute to the stability of the region.

Moreover, in his opinion, only Ukraine can check the pressure in Russia caused by new political forces like that of Zhirinovskiy. For, in his view, the renaissance of these fascist movements is a menace not only to Ukraine, but also to Europe as a whole.

**Delstanche:** Do you think it will be easy to obtain the Ukrainian Parliament's support for the tripartite agreement on denuclearization?

**Buteyko:** The agreement does not formally require ratification. On the other hand, when Parliament ratified



the Start I treaty, it voiced a certain number of reservations, in particular concerning the security guarantee for Ukraine, and the provision of technological and financial assistance in the context of disarmament. In fact, it must be clear that when Start I was negotiated, all the arms to be destroyed had to be eliminated using the combined economic resources of the USSR as a whole, whereas now we would have to destroy them using our own resources. That, however, is impossible in view of the economic crisis ravaging our country. Furthermore, the destruction of this arsenal will benefit the Western nations at which the arms in question were aimed. Therefore, it is logical that they should contribute to that process, for we are contributing to their security. Then again, Parliament has asked for compensation for the material contained in the tactical and strategic arms handed over to Russia.

In addition, it must be remembered that the negotiations were launched at the initiative of Ukraine, but that neither the United States nor Russia took our interests into account. It was Parliament's decision regarding the Start I treaty that provided a positive impulse in the negotiations. All the more so since we also understood that it was impossible to resolve certain matters on a bilateral basis.

**Horyn:** Well, this high-ranking German official explained his idea in approximately this way. Ukraine is presently in a state of crisis. We do not have enough food. However, some 10 years will pass, and our state will finally be standing on its own two feet. It will be a competitor on European agricultural markets. At the same time, traditional exporters, such as Germany and France, will find themselves in a difficult situation....

I replied to those arguments by saying that had Ukraine remained within the empire, the entire Europe would have been compelled to spend huge amounts of money on armaments in order to insure themselves against the imperial threat. Europe would have trembled before the Moscow empire as it did after World War II.

Ukraine is not only a dream of the people and the form of their survival. Ukraine is a factor of stability, peace, and de-imperialization in Europe. Ukraine must become a therapist of the imperial moods that prevail among the Russian people. The recent elections in Russia are disturbing.

**Pasichnyy:** After all, the consequences of the recent elections in Russia have again placed before the world a threat of direct invasion from Moscow. Chauvinism is still alive, and it has now acquired features of communo-fascism....

**Horyn:** Yes, they showed that it is not only the ruling circles in the Kremlin that are infected with the virus of imperialism. Many Russians display deep nostalgia for the empire, because its very existence raised our neighbors in their own eyes.

The results of the elections in Russia have also contributed to a change in orientations in the West's attitude toward Ukraine. Instead of diktat, we see a striving for a dialogue.

**Pasichnyy:** Pan Mykhaylo, you, as chairman of Ukraine's Republican Party, are a candidate for deputy of the Supreme Council at the coming elections. What is the attitude of the Republicans toward Ukraine's nuclear status?

**Horyn:** We believe that the very fact of nuclear missiles in Ukraine is a guarantee for us and a warning for all of our neighbors that they should refrain from playing with fire. We are not opponents of disarmament and we are not against dismantling those missiles whose service life has expired. However, in our opinion, 46 missiles must be left and dismantled only after all nuclear powers make identical steps.

One more thing. Russia, after it received from us a large number of medium-range missiles, has not to this day paid us for the nuclear fuel—this sum constitutes several billions of U.S. dollars.

I, for example, do not agree that, while dismantling the nuclear warheads, we should also be compelled to dismantle the missiles themselves. They are our separate property—they were built at our factories. We will be able to use them to protect ourselves from territorial encroachments by aggressors.

I hope that the president will not hasten to sign the necessary documents that would fully disarm Ukraine. It would be an irreparable blunder.

#### **IZVESTIYA Says Ukrainian Army Wants To Delay Disarmament**

*PM2501100594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian  
25 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1-2*

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Not Everyone in Ukrainian Missile Forces Agrees With President Kravchuk"]

[Text] There is growing opposition within the Ukrainian Army—as there is within parliament—to the tripartite statement signed in Moscow by President Leonid Kravchuk, U.S. President Bill Clinton, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

This IZVESTIYA correspondent has learned that, at a Ukrainian Defense Ministry Collegium session 21 January devoted to the training of military personnel in the country's higher educational establishments and the strengthening of discipline among the troops, Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhtyuk, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces 43d Missile Army stationed in Vinnitsa, and Major General Nikolay Filatov, commander of the 46th Missile Division from Pervomaysk in Nikolayev Oblast, unexpectedly and without prior arrangement took the Ukrainian military oath.



Major General Rustam Karimov, commander of the 19th Missile Division stationed in Khmelnytskyi, refused to take the Ukrainian oath at this collegium session and stated that he would not even do so before his own combined unit—where 40 percent of the officers do not want to swear an oath of allegiance to a fatherland yet again. That accounts for 413 of the 1,017 officers in the division. Of these, 354 want to move to Russia for the rest of their service, while the others want to be discharged to the reserve and go to live back home.

Given that, before last Friday, the leading personnel of the missile army and missile divisions stationed in Ukraine as well as the overwhelming majority of other missile officers had not sworn loyalty to Ukraine, this step by the Defense Ministry Collegium is being seen by some observers as a direct challenge to the policy announced by President Leonid Kravchuk in the sphere of his state's nuclear missile disarmament, and as an attempt to complicate and delay this process as long as possible, to make it as unpredictable as possible, and to nullify cooperation with Russia in carrying out the START I and II treaties.

As is well known, there are 176 strategic RS-18 liquid-propellant missiles (90 in Khmelnytskyi and 40 in Pervomaysk) and RS-22 solid-propellant (all 46 in Pervomaysk) launch systems with 1,250 nuclear warheads plus 650 air-launched cruise missile assemblies [bloki] in Ukraine. The Strategic Nuclear Forces Administrative Command and Control Center is located there, and the creation of nuclear space forces has been announced.

The elimination of the strategic nuclear complex along with the country's fulfillment of its commitments under the Lisbon Protocol to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state represents for many Ukrainian generals—particularly those who had recently moved to top jobs in the Kiev Defense Ministry—the complete end of their careers. They will naturally do all they can to prevent it.

Meanwhile the situation in the Ukrainian Missile Forces—this is no secret to specialists—remains very complex despite all the reassuring statements from Ukrainian generals. Many missile systems have come to the end of their warranty and inspection and maintenance [reglamentnyy] servicing period. The state does not have enough money to carry out the servicing.

In 1993 Ukrainian specialists stood down two RS-18 strategic missile regiments in Pervomaysk and Khmelnytskyi (10 RS-18's each). The nuclear warheads were dismantled and sent to technical storage bases, the missiles were removed from their silos, their oxidants and fuel were transferred to special tanks, and the missiles were loaded onto railcars and prepared for dispatch to "Yuzhmashzavod" in Dnepropetrovsk. But each dismantled missile still contains up to 100 kg of a highly toxic substance—one of the components of the missile fuel. The equipment to degasify them does not

exist, nor does the technology for processing the heptyl. The plant turned out not to be ready to receive these missiles.

It was necessary to remove them from the railcars and transfer the toxic liquids from the rail tanks into other containers. The dismantling of obsolete [vysluzhivshikh svoi sloki] missiles has been halted indefinitely. There are neither the warehouses, nor the specialized transportation, nor the funds to handle them. Officers are angry that they are being forced to do such a dangerous and senseless job.

Their service conditions and their pay are far lower than in Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. For instance, a missile division commander in Ukraine earns 2.2 million coupons-karbovantsi a month. If this sum is expressed in Russian rubles [R] at the actual exchange rate (24 to 1), it turns out that a Ukrainian general is "valued" less than a Russian lieutenant—who earned around R100,000 in December 1993 and will have been earning 90 percent more as of January. Moreover, last month Ukraine's missile troops received their pay literally on the eve of the New Year, after major scandals at the Finance Ministry, and have not yet seen any money this January.

#### Kiev Radio Quotes U.S. Ambassador

WS1901204494 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program  
Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] The negotiations held by the U.S., Russian, and Ukrainian presidents in Moscow could have failed to take place or become an unofficial meeting if it had not been for the courage displayed by Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuk. This particularly applies to the Ukrainian president. This was declared by U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine William Miller at a press conference organized today at the American House by the mass media. The tripartite agreement adopted in Moscow is an extremely important document opening broad perspectives in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, he emphasized. William Miller told the journalists about the negotiation processes that led up to signing this document conducted by representatives of the three states to coordinate nuclear disarmament efforts. The drive in favor of reduction and, later on, elimination of nuclear arsenals began in the late 1960's. Following the demise of the Soviet Union, this process not only continued but also [word indistinct]. Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan [word indistinct] safe regions. Of all these countries, Ukraine is the most central to the United States of America since almost all nuclear missiles stationed on its territory were targeted at the United States. I am happy that people who live in our countries can sigh with relief, because the threat that used to hang over our heads has blown over, the ambassador said. He described as very important the fact that the three presidents reached an agreement on procedures for transportation to Russia of nuclear warheads deployed

in Ukraine based on compensation and security assurances. Ukraine will receive 100 metric tons of uranium for its nuclear power plants as compensation for the removal of the warheads.

### Supreme Council Ratifies START

WS1901085994 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] Yesterday, Ukrainian Supreme Council deputies ratified the USSR-U.S. Treaty on the Limitation and Reduction of Strategic Offensive Weapons signed on 31 July 1991 in Moscow and an accompanying protocol signed in Lisbon in the name of Ukraine on 23 May 1992.

### Parliament Speaker Cited on NPT

LD2501133794 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1245 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Kiev, 25 Jan—The Supreme Council of Ukraine began its session today under the chairmanship of Speaker Ivan Plyushch. [passage omitted]

With regard to the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty, Ivan Plyushch said that the last time parliament discussed the issue was on 18 November 1993, when it adopted reservations concerning ratification of the START treaty. Since then, the president of Ukraine has carried out a great deal of work which resulted in the signing of the Moscow statement.

Plyushch said the president of Ukraine requested the Supreme Council to examine the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. However, the Supreme Council's three standing commissions which met 24 January with the participation of the working group dealing with ratification of the treaty, failed to find a common solution.

The parliament speaker said that this afternoon's session of the Supreme Council will look at the resolution on the state privatization program for 1994.

### Meeting on Securing Conditions for Missile, Space Research

LD2601190994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1855 GMT 26 Jan 94

[by UKRINFORM-TASS]

[Text] Kiev January 26 TASS—A session of the Ukrainian National Committee for Disarmament has considered specific ways to secure external conditions for implementing Ukraine's national missile and space research programme.

The participants in the session discussed a number of problems related to Ukraine's possible joining the system of international control over missile technologies.

### Columnist Questions Allegiance of Vinnytsya Rocket Army

WS2001144094 Lvov SHLYAKH PEREMOHY in Ukrainian 15 Jan 94 p 5

[Article by Dmytro Ulas: "To Whom Does the Ukrainian Rocket Army Belong?"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] During the third year of our independence, we have finally learned that there are certain military units deployed on Ukrainian territory with servicemen who have not taken the oath of allegiance to the state that feeds, clothes, and provides housing for them.

In the era of the Soviet Union, communist propaganda would describe similar military units as occupying forces. Even if foreign armed forces were deployed on the territory of certain country, for example Germany, they were financed and provided with all necessities by the state that had sent them, and to which they had pledged allegiance. Americans have always made payments to the governments of those countries in which their Armed Forces have been deployed, even for use of the land.

Which military units deployed on Ukrainian soil pledged allegiance to the USSR, and are still living according to the laws of the deceased Union? No, this is not the Black Sea Fleet which has been proclaimed Ukraine's property following Russia's example, which has appropriated all former fleets of the USSR and property of units that were deployed outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. God bless the fleet, if no responsible official in Ukraine wants to even hear about its problems.

Yet, the subject of this article is different. This is the Vinnytsya Rocket Army, the weapons and property of which belong to Ukraine according to agreements between Russia and Ukraine, which have also been recognized by the international community. The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that missiles with nuclear warheads remain in the hands of those who continue to serve the nonexistent totalitarian state.

This can be confirmed by the fact that military leaders of the Army refuse to make officers and warrant officers take the oath of allegiance to the Ukrainian people, and fail to sign contracts with those who consider themselves servicemen of the Russian Army. Even today, symbols of the former Soviet Union remain on the headquarters and barracks of certain units, and officers and warrant officers wear uniforms with emblems of the nonexistent Soviet Army. Perhaps they all expect that the past will return? Exactly the opposite.

This refuge of communist ideology is preserved thanks to the political speculations and intrigues of the Army leaders and top officials in divisions. They slyly gamble on today's hardships of officers and warrant officers, comparing Russians and Ukrainians.

Each time the issue of administering the oath of allegiance to Ukraine arises, insinuations of violating the rights of Russian servicemen appear, and rumors are spread that as soon as they take the oath they will have to return to Russia.

As a matter of fact, Russian troops are not going to leave until they sell the apartments provided them by the Defense Ministry. They are not pricing them too low, either: A one-bedroom apartment costs no less than \$5,000. Let us figure the losses for our state. They curse Ukraine and threaten to drop from service, they do not leave their apartments, and they continue to consume their food rations and buy dollars with the money they receive from the Defense Ministry of Ukraine. This is the life of Russian soldiers according to the oath of allegiance to the Soviet Union, and nobody knows exactly who they serve.

However, the last statement is not completely true, since at the beginning of November, the defense minister of the Russian Federation inspected the combat readiness of the units and conducted a training exercise for commanders of the Rocket Army of Ukraine. How can one understand this? What will the commander in chief of the Ukraine's Armed Forces say on this occasion?

#### **Nuclear Control Said 'Technically Possible'**

AU1001120094 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY  
in Ukrainian 6 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by Anatoliy Martsynovskyy: "Missiles on Target. Ukrainian Nuclear Weapons Are Among the Main Objectives in Moscow's Offensive External Policy"—first paragraph published in boldface]

[Text] It would be naive to believe that our missiles constitute a military threat for Russia. These missiles are under the operational control of Russia's Strategic Missile Troops headquarters; they are serviced by Russian specialists alongside Ukrainian ones; our military doctrine does not envisage first nuclear strike, and so forth. Notwithstanding this, Russia seeks Ukraine's nuclear disarmament as soon as possible and the "missiles issue" remains a stumbling-block in relations between Ukraine and Russia.

Moscow is developing vigorous activity. Taking advantage of its prestige (more specifically, our lack of prestige) in the world, it does everything it can to continue playing the role of a big brother who holds the younger brother's hand and keeps pointing at him: "A naughty boy!" This negative image of Ukraine, the image of a minor nuclear aggressor is also steadily being created by the Russian mass media, which are readily quoted by the West. The world community is being encouraged to put pressure upon Ukraine. An appeal was recently issued by Russian designers, scientists, and specialists of the Atomic Energy Ministry [Minatom] to citizens and governments of world states, in which the Russians intimidated those governments with the dangerous state of

Ukrainian nuclear warheads. All the numerous statements by high-ranking Ukrainian politicians and military figures on the groundlessness of such assertions do not produce any special effect and constitute, figuratively speaking, whispers against a background of Russian loudspeakers.

Russia's official argument in this political struggle is the dangerous state of our missiles. Having pointed out that our politicians (people's deputy Serhiy Semenets, co-chairman of the group for studying aspects of ratifying START-I: "Emergency Situations Are Impossible") and military figures (Minister of Defense Vitaliy Radetskyy: "The State of Missile Facilities Is Satisfactory") have a different opinion, we will proceed to some other, more spontaneous, methods resorted to by Moscow for attaining Ukraine's nuclear disarmament.

If Ukraine gets rid of its missiles, Russia will become the only nuclear power in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. This will also give it the traditional and desired possibility to be at the top. The Russian desire to be in control is more than obvious: For example, Russia's nervous reaction to plans by Poland, Hungary, and Czechia to join NATO was very revealing. If such plans are implemented, the alignment of forces promoted in the region will not be in Russia's best interests. At a recent (1 December 1993) CSCE conference in Rome, Russia demanded that the mandate of a peacekeeper in CIS countries be given to it—not a single country supported that initiative. Fortunately for us, because that mandate, alongside statements by Russian politicians, in particular, Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Kozyrev ("Russia must actively defend the rights of the Russian-speaking population, using rapid-deployment forces for the purpose"), would give our neighbors an opportunity for large-scale activities, since (again, from Moscow's point of view) that "Russian-speaking population" is abused in almost every former Union republic. Thus, Russia is clearly striving to gain control of the region, and Ukrainian missiles, which are presently a real factor of deterrence, do not in any way suit its "far-reaching" plans.

Another factor of Russian impatience is totally prosaic—the cost of the content of the Ukrainian warheads. This amounts to billions of U.S. dollars. That is why Russia demands that the warheads be transferred precisely to it. Kazakhstan, which had hitherto been "quiet," played a dirty trick on Moscow: On 13 December, an American-Kazakhstan agreement was signed—the Americans want to buy the entire uranium content of Kazakhstan's missiles. That uranium is worth about \$1 billion; therefore, this money is flowing under Russia's nose into Kazakhstan's treasury. Moscow newspapers immediately called Kazakhstan's missiles "in fact, Russian property" and regretted that Ukraine's uncompromising position is having such a bad influence upon Kazakhstan's behavior. Therefore, Russia's striving to get hold of Ukrainian warheads is perfectly understandable, as is also Moscow's anxiety on this point: There is no



agreement between Ukraine and Russia on transferring warheads to Russian plants.

Russia's reaction to our parliament's decree on ratifying START-I was all the more negative. At that time, Moscow resembled a furious fisherman looking at yet another empty hook. Kozyrev demonstratively refused to receive our Ambassador Volodymyr Kryzhanivskyy. The aforementioned appeal by Russian scientists to the world was quickly arranged. The Moscow press, having stopped pouring dirt by buckets, opened all the taps on the tank.

A few words on the decree itself. It is quite obvious that this document cannot be assessed in a simple way. Yes, despite previous promises, we have actually become a nuclear power, although temporarily so; yes, the decree is at variance with some articles of the Lisbon Protocol under which our president's signature appears; yes, the document itself, from the point of view of politicians, contains rather naive points regarding security guarantees for Ukraine. However, it is pointless to assert either the wisdom or worthlessness of that document, proceeding from immediate considerations alone: Doubtless the future, perhaps, not so distant, will provide such an assessment. Let me remind you that the deputies almost unanimously (what a surprise!) approved the reduction, over seven years, of 36 percent of launch vehicles and 42 percent of warheads. They [the deputies] advanced conditions to the world: Never use nuclear weapons against Ukraine; do not use conventional armed forces against it, and do not resort to the threat of force; refrain from exerting economic pressure for the purpose of resolving any disputes; respect Ukraine's territorial integrity and inviolability of borders. By the time the decree was adopted, Ukraine had 176 vertical-launch installations with 1,240 nuclear warheads and 43 heavy bombers with 372 nuclear warheads.

That the position of the Ukrainian parliament should not be characterized in categorically negative terms was soon confirmed by the Russian elections in which Zhirinovskiy, a "sincere friend" of the former imperial colonies, triumphed. Anti-Ukrainian articles on nuclear topics immediately disappeared from Moscow newspapers (apparently, not for long). The world became concerned and a question arose: Is it generally safe to transfer the Union's nuclear weapons to Russia? At any rate, the warheads of 17 missiles that were deactivated by Ukraine at the end of December have remained "at home." At other times, this would have given rise to certain emotions in Russia. Now, there is complete tranquility. Maybe, the United States will also revise its policy with regard to Ukraine. So far, it only listened to what Russia was saying.

According to [Ukrainian President] Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine will continue to adhere to its decision to become a nuclear-free state, but we will demand that a tripartite agreement be concluded with Russia and the United States. Meanwhile, an opinion is being formed among Ukrainian parliamentarians on the need for Ukraine to

gain full control of its missiles: Such control on the part of Russia is dangerous for our country. It is significant that there is no nonaggression agreement between the two states. Besides, Russia's military doctrine envisages a preventive nuclear strike against nuclear countries. Technically speaking, according to specialists, it is not a major problem for Ukraine to gain positive control over the missiles. The problem is, rather, a political one.

Without doubt, we are in favor of a nuclear-free world. However, at present, a number of political and economic considerations prompt us to refrain from hasty steps, such as was the proclamation of the country's nuclear-free status at the dawn of our independence. At any rate, the fulfillment of the parliament's decree has already started, and this is a specific step toward a nuclear-free Ukraine.

#### **Official Says Nuclear Weapons Storage Unstable**

*LD1801225894 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 18 Jan 94*

[Text] Nuclear weapons, whose shelf life is reaching its upper limit, can now pose a threat to Ukraine. Kostyantyn Hryshchenko, head of the directorate of control over armaments and disarmament of Ukraine's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stressed this during a meeting with journalists on 18 January. He emphasized that all components necessary for the safe storage of nuclear weapons, hydrogen absorbers in particular, are manufactured in Russia and until recently were not being supplied to Ukraine. Hryshchenko noted that this led to the storage of nuclear weapons becoming increasingly unstable. The threat was gradually increasing and demanded a resolution. In the opinion of the representative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after Ukraine's experience with Chernobyl it would be extremely irresponsible not to take this situation into account.

#### **Daily Questions Private Takeover of Former Missile Base**

*WS2101155294 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 20 Jan 94 p 4*

[Report by Yiriy Kril: "Lvov 'Konza' Company Seized a Missile Base"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] The "Konza" company appeared three years ago with the consent of Mr. Davymuka, the acting Ukrainian presidential representative in Lvov, and Lvov Oblast Prosecutor Mr. Kotyko, as a company specializing in innovative scientific products to be traded abroad. Recently, we have learned why "Konza" protected itself from excessive public scrutiny. After its inception, "Konza" created a territorial innovation center called "Agrotekhnopark" in Brody, Lvov Oblast. This center was established at a former missile base with an area of 320 hectares. The base is located in a fenced-in patch of forest and includes a three-story former command post, a two-story former headquarters



building, two-story hotel, seven military barracks, privates' and officers' canteens, a medical center, enormous depots, a sauna, garages, and other facilities which can ensure maintenance of this huge military center. [passage omitted]

A document was signed to hand over this former military base to "Konza" and the site is currently protected by

some 40 guards. In the opinion of People's Deputy Chobit, Ukrainian President Kravchuk should initiate an official investigation into this case because, at the beginning, it was presumed that the base would be turned over to the National Guard of Ukraine. So, why has "Konza" become the proprietor of this facility? Why has the former military base not been sold at auction? Why has "Konza" completed this deal so hastily?

## REGIONAL AFFAIRS

**Defense Minister Proposes Arms Control for Mediterranean**

NC0701071994 Nicosia Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation Radio Network in Greek 0530 GMT 7 Jan 94

[Text] Greek National Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis proposed the establishment of an arms-control system for the Mediterranean. Arsenis outlined his proposal during an address at an international seminar titled "Armament Limitation and Security in the Middle East," which was held in Athens by the International Relations Institute of Pandion University of Athens and the University of California's Institute of International Conflict and Cooperation.

Arsenis said that this arms-control system could be based on the principle of territorial integrity, inviolate borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and not using force. Greece, he added, is particularly worried about the issue of nuclear weapons in Central Asia and the Middle East and Turkey's interest in these weapons, given that, since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the possibilities for nuclear proliferation have increased, as have the possibilities for the spread of nuclear technology and know-how to unstable regions.

## GERMANY

**Plans To Ease Arms Export Restrictions****Internal Debate**

LD0501210194 Munich ARD Television Network in German 1900 GMT 5 Jan 94

[Text] New details have been revealed today of Bonn's efforts to change the guidelines on German arms exports. According to these details, the government, too, is seeking to make arms exports easier. According to information obtained by our Bonn office, talks on this have been conducted between the Defense, Economics, and Foreign Ministries. Yesterday the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] parliamentary group spoke in favor of easing the export provisions. The Social Democratic Party [SPD] announced its resistance to this. Gerd H. Pelletier reports.

**Pelletier:** One day after the move forward by CDU deputies toward relaxing the arms export provisions, today it was revealed that the ministries concerned—defense, economics, and foreign—have been dealing with the European harmonization of the tricky issue for weeks already. The confidential file has lain at the Federal Chancellery since before the Christmas period. It says that a ruling on dual-use exports is urgent. For example, we have the case of the Libyan toxic gas factory in Rabta, which the German company Imhausen Chemie claimed was a fertilizer plant. When the deal was uncovered, company head Hippenstiel was sentenced

and regulations on granting export permits were tightened drastically. All-European guidelines are being called for in this area. But Ruehe's Defense Ministry also wants to make it easier for the arms industry to export.

Kinkel's Foreign ministry, however, would prefer to adhere to the Arms Export Control Act of 1982. For example, if the British partners require the future Eurofighter to be desertworthy, the German manufacturing partners will know that it was to be sold outside the NATO area. Must our arms export restrictions be relaxed for that reason?

[Begin Kinkel recording] For some time we have been considering in the responsible ministries—in cooperation between the Foreign Ministry and the Defense Ministry—how we can deal with this sticky issue. We mustn't rush at it. We will look at the CDU/CSU proposals, which have now been submitted, in addition to our own ideas, and then decide in good time. [end recording]

**Pelletier:** The arms industry does not want to wait that long. European reality: The company Eurocopter is a DASA enterprise with French majority ownership. The German partners cannot and do not want to know where the French parent company, Aerospatiale, is selling the combat helicopters. Whatever happens, it is thought less likely that the European partners will give in to the cautious German arms export restrictions in the short or long term. It is more likely that the compromise will lie in the gradual relaxing of these German provisions.

**Opposition To Plan**

AU0701182594 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 6 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

["K.B." report: "Unexpected Protest Against Easier Arms Exports"]

[Text] Bonn, 5 January—Several leading members of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU]/Christian Social Union [CSU] Bundestag group have criticized foreign policy spokesman Lamers for his statements on arms export controls. Lamers had demanded the establishment of common European export rules. This would make arms exports easier than they are in line with the current German regulations. The Federal Government, too, is skeptical about this suggestion. So far, it has been assumed that a memorandum of the Foreign Policy Working Group, headlined "Common European Defense—Common Arms Market—Common Arms Export Policy," which was drawn up with Lamers' participation, meets with approval by the Bundestag group. This memorandum, which was published at the end of November, is now causing excitement with some delay. On Wednesday deputy group chairman Gerster came out against loosening the German export rules. Before one can think of approving regulated arms exports along broader lines and for larger areas, one must emphatically counteract excessive illegal deliveries of armament materiel in an internationally coordinated

action. CDU Deputy Eppelmann, the former GDR defense minister, thinks that it is rather necessary to tighten the arms export rules instead of loosening them.

In order to combat illegal arms trade, Gerster demands additional legal regulations. It must be possible to use findings by the Federal Intelligence Office [BND] gained from monitoring against German arms dealers in court. Germany must not become the turntable for weapons from the former East Bloc. Therefore, checks at the borders must be tightened not only by the Customs Administration and the Federal Border Police, but also with the help of the Bundeswehr.

Eppelmann criticized the proposal by Lamers and the Foreign Policy Working Group for not aiming at solving conflicts. Lamers does not speak of disarmament. The working group seems to want to resign itself to the current conditions.

As was confirmed on Wednesday, the Federal Government does not intend to follow the demand for loosening the export guidelines and export control regulations. However, there are indications of considerations to change the examination and licensing procedures with the final decision in the Federal Security Council. This is aimed at making the German armament industry more able to cooperate in Europe. This would be a reaction to complaints from the armament industry that purely private cooperation projects between German and European companies are delayed so much by the licensing procedures that German companies are on the brink of becoming incapable of cooperation. The procedures should be made equal to those for the smoother official cooperation projects initiated by the state.

In the Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD] it has been confirmed that it opposes any loosening of regulations both for arms exports as well as for civilian supplies that can be used for armament. SPD economic expert Schwanhold said that the Military Materiel Control Law and the Foreign Trade Law must continue to be handled strictly. The strict German rules should, if possible, become the standard for harmonization in the European Union. The goal of German policy in the new role of the country must be worldwide disarmament and the conversion of armament industries to civilian production facilities. Deputy SPD Chairwoman Wieczorek-Zeul said that arms exports cannot safeguard Germany as an industrial location. Arms exports would only hurt Germany's reputation in the world.

## TURKEY

### Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Joining NPT

TA2601192494 Ankara TRT Television Network  
in Turkish 1800 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Announcer-read report over video]

[Text] Turkey is pleased with the agreement reached among Ukraine, Russia, and the United States on the removal of the nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Speaking at his weekly news conference today, Ferhat Ataman, acting spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, recalled that Ukrainian President Kravchuk recently confirmed his promise to join the nuclear nonproliferation agreement as a non-nuclear country as soon as possible. Ataman said: We see this as an important contribution to peace and security—which we are all trying to establish—and to the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

**Disarmament Conference Opens 25 January in Geneva****Russian Arms Negotiator Cited on Test Bans**

LD2501130294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English  
1251 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva January 25 TASS—Will nuclear weapons testing grounds be finally closed? The solution of this problem, on which politicians, military leaders and diplomats have been racking their brains for several past decades, may be brought closer by the annual session of the UN disarmament conference, which opened here today.

Having completed in 1992 the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons, it is now getting down to the discussion of the problem of an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests. The session is being attended by delegations from 37 states-members of the conference, including Russia.

"The banning of tests is a very important measure, primarily from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons," Grigoriy Berdennikov, Russia's permanent representative, told ITAR-TASS. "It is not a matter of concluding a treaty among the nuclear powers alone, but a matter of complete and universal prohibition of tests in all the countries of the world. This will guarantee us against the emergence of a new possessor of nuclear weapons."

The Geneva session is particularly important in light of current preparations for a conference of signatories of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty, scheduled for 1995. This conference may adopt a decision to prolong the treaty forever.

"The idea of fully banning nuclear tests was advanced by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. We have traditionally backed this initiative," Berdennikov added. "The treaty to ban tests in three media was concluded in 1963. We have also signed a treaty with the Americans to restrict the yield of nuclear tests. We are observing a moratorium on tests for several years now. Everybody admits that it has created a good background for talks in Geneva."

"The main problem after the end of the 'Cold War' is to save the world from the 'spreading' of mass destruction weapons and means for their delivery," the Russian representative said. "It is very important to reach agreement on security guarantees to non-nuclear state and on stopping the output of fissionable materials. The current session of the conference will also focus its attention on these problems."

**Criticism of North Korea**

AU2501123894 Paris AFP in English 1219 GMT  
25 Jan 94

[Text] Geneva, Jan 25 (AFP)—The 39-nation UN Conference on Disarmament opened here Tuesday with French Ambassador Gerard Errera denouncing North Korea's refusal to allow international inspections of its nuclear sites.

Errera, chairman of the conference, said Pyongyang's refusal cannot be "treated as only a regional issue."

He said the world's major nuclear powers—the United States, Russia, France, Britain and China—could not "accept to impose nuclear constraints on themselves if other countries continue to secretly develop nuclear weapons programs."

North Korea suspended inspections of its nuclear sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in January 1993 and three months later threatened to pull-out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, sparking fears that it was developing or had already developed a nuclear bomb.

Errera added that Iraq had also raised fears within the international community that it was developing its nuclear capability and that the breakup of the Soviet Union was threatening the implementation of the non-proliferation treaty.

There are fears that stocks of fissionable material have been sold or otherwise channelled from former Soviet bloc countries to countries secretly engaged in nuclear research.

The UN conference here, aimed at securing pledges from the nuclear powers for a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), is to set up an ad-hoc committee to negotiate the treaty.

The United States has already expressed reservations about Iraq being a member.

UN representative Vladimir Petrovskiy said Tuesday that he would be in favor of enlarging the committee to include additional members.

Errera, in his opening statement, also said that "today's reality does not reflect the past where two superpowers could negotiate between themselves a disarmament treaty and then present it for ratification by the international community."

The five nuclear powers nevertheless have their own reservations about a CTBT.

The United States, Russia, France and Britain have for example suspended their tests, whereas China carried out an explosion as recently as last October and appears in no hurry to conclude testing.



In any event, signing a test ban treaty would in no way imply that the nuclear five were ready to give up their nuclear stockpiles or abandon the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

Errera said he could not predict how long the conference would last. "The main thing is that the talks should be taken seriously so that we can work towards a treaty acceptable to everybody."

It appeared unlikely that they would conclude before the 1995 expiry date of the current Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which the western powers wish to extend for a period of several years.

#### **Expanded Membership Debated**

*OW2501153194 Tokyo KYODO in English 1455 GMT  
25 Jan 94*

[Text] Geneva, Jan. 25 KYODO—Japan and the United States appeared at odds Tuesday [25 January] over whether to include North Korea, Iraq and 21 other nations in an expanded conference on disarmament.

The United Nations-backed conference opened Tuesday to discuss a total ban on nuclear weapons tests, while suggestions of expanding the 37-member conference to 60 divided the meeting.

John Holum, director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said it would be important for an expanded conference to include the nations that are suspected of trying to develop nuclear weapons.

Japanese Government sources, without specifically mentioning North Korea, said Japan cannot agree to allowing into the conference nations with which there are problems with the inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and problems with executing disarmament related treaties.

North Korea has repeatedly denied that it is attempting to develop an atomic bomb, but its refusal to permit IAEA and inter-Korean inspections of its facilities has aroused suspicion about its motives.

While the U.S. was apparently indicating no objection to adding North Korea to the conference, it did indicate that it would be opposed to including Iraq, against which the U.S. led a multinational coalition against [as received] in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

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